

The Future of NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture: Views from Central Europe

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Introduction

The year 2012 saw the completion of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), which was mandated by the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon as a follow-up to the new Strategic Concept. This process involved, for the first time in the post-Cold War history of the Alliance, a comprehensive re-examination of the utility of the main elements of NATO's posture: nuclear weapons, missile defence capabilities and conventional forces. The review also examined arms-control and disarmament issues, with the nuclear policy of the Alliance and the deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe proving to be a major bone of contention. While consensus on the contents of the DDPR was reached by the time of the 2012 Chicago Summit, many observers summarised it as a prolongation of the status quo and an attempt to "freeze" the deterrence posture of the Alliance, irrespective of the changing international environment, difficult financial situation, and inter-Alliance developments. The countries of Central Europe took quite an active part in the DDPR debates, motivated by their distinctive perception of the strategic environment (in which Russia features prominently) and a strong attachment to the traditional collective security profile of the Alliance.

This report is meant to provide an analytical glimpse into the future—the next decade of the functioning of NATO's deterrence posture, as seen from Central Europe. It contains chapters written by international security experts from the region as well as contributions from the United States on the U.S. approach towards Central Europe's security needs. The contributors were asked to concentrate on the perceptions of the security environment and threat in their countries or sub-regions of Central Europe, the assessment of the credibility of NATO's defence and deterrence posture, and the way forward, especially from the point of view of the sustainability of the current posture. While the scope of the report goes beyond the nuclear policy of the Alliance, one of the questions posed to the contributors concerned the feasibility of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy.

Despite important sub-regional differences, all of the authors underline the issue of the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture as their main preoccupation. From the perspective of Central Europe, Russia is still seen as the main "recipient" of the Alliance's deterrence message, since the experts tend to assume the continuation of the present foreign and security policies of Moscow. While the possibility of pursuing arms control and confidence-building with Russia should not be discarded, the strategic communities in the region believe that NATO should have at its disposal the right set of capabilities needed for deterrence tasks. For most of the regional experts, these capabilities still include the non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.

The analyses gathered in this volume do not, however, support the notion that the nuclear dimension represents for Central Europeans the core of deterrence capabilities. The contributors point out first of all the underlying issue of the political unity of the Allies, based on widely-shared priorities, the threat perception and the willingness to act jointly. Moreover, from the Central European perspective, the role of non-nuclear capabilities will only increase in the future, and they foresee intimidation scenarios (in which the nuclear element of NATO's posture may have limited or no use) as the most probable challenges of the next decade. They note with concern the long-term impact of the financial crisis on NATO's military potential, pointing also to the unsatisfactory performance of some of the countries from the region, which have cut defence spending and thus have undercut their own case for credible deterrence.

As shown by the chapters on the U.S. approach to Central Europe and on the extended deterrence debate in East Asia and the Middle East, regional preferences regarding the future of NATO's posture will need to be reconciled with the wider interests of the United States and the consequences of developments in other regions. For the United States, the financial aspect of sustaining the deterrence posture in Europe and the issue of burden-sharing will become even more acute than at present. Central Europeans may also need to compete for U.S. attention with the latter's allies and partners in other regions, especially those in East Asia.

Taken into account the perspective of a turbulent next decade in which the viability of NATO's defence and deterrence posture will be subjected to both external and internal pressures, understanding the concerns and viewpoints of Central Europeans would help in charting the right course for the Alliance.

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The Future of NATO's Defence and Deterrence Posture: V4 Perspectives

Jacek Durkalec

Cooperation among the four Central European states that make up the V4 (the Visegrad states, which includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) has had its ups and downs.¹ This collaboration has reflected a degree of convergence of interests and assessments whether an individual or concerted approach is more beneficial to the achievement of their goals. Considerations of whether to advocate their interests separately or collectively have also influenced their approaches to defence and security issues, including the NATO accession process and activities within the Alliance.

The intensive debates about NATO's Strategic Concept and Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) showed that although some differences in their approaches exist, the V4 states were able to work out not only a common view on challenges to the Alliance but also of required NATO capabilities. It is likely that the V4 states will continue to synchronise their positions in the future. In the next decade this will be of particular importance as NATO members will implement many important decisions related to "the overall mix" of NATO capabilities, including nuclear, conventional forces and missile defence (MD).

The Security Environment and Threat Perceptions

The V4 states' assessments of the threats and challenges of the 21st century security environment, while not identical, are overlapping. The common threads in their approaches result from similar Cold War historical experiences, their geopolitical position and—as the V4 states' security is inseparable from the security of other NATO members—broader Alliance considerations.

The Visegrad states recognise the current pre-eminence of global non-military and asymmetrical threats from state and non-state actors such as terrorism, cyberattacks, proliferation of WMD and its means of delivery, or the disruption of energy supplies. Their perception to security is not limited to their own territory and the Euro-Atlantic area. They share a view that instability in or beyond Europe could impact their security and may require NATO's engagement.

What, however, seems profound in the V4 states' threat perceptions and makes them similar to other Central and Eastern European NATO members (including the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania), is the attention they attach to traditional security challenges. According to the Visegrad states, although the probability of a massive military attack or a local conventional conflict is currently very low, it has to be taken into consideration.

To a significant extent, such a perception is related to the V4 states' views of Russia. On the one hand, none of the V4 states see Russia as an imminent threat. They are vitally interested in peaceful relations with that country and recognise the political, economic and security benefits of cooperation. On the other hand, Russia is still considered to be a possible security challenge.

In recent years, Poland has expressed concerns about Russian responses to U.S. plans to deploy MD systems on Polish territory, including the deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Oblast, just next to the Polish border. Also, Poland has found it difficult to explain

¹ All these states are members of the Visegrad Group—an informal regional coalition founded in 1991 in the Hungarian city of Visegrad to foster regional cooperation on issues of common importance. For more, see: www.visegradgroup.eu

(even when taking into account NATO's current overall conventional superiority) why Russia maintains such a disproportionately large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), amounting to about 2,000 operational warheads, or why some of those warheads must be stored near the Polish border. The Polish concerns were exacerbated by the 2009 "Zapad" exercises during which Russia simulated a nuclear strike against Polish territory and a lack of Russian transparency regarding the doctrine, numbers, locations, operational statuses and command arrangements of the Russian arsenal. The other matter of Polish concern has been the ongoing modernisation of the Russian armed forces and a lack of transparency of its conventional forces following Russia's suspension of compliance with the CFE Treaty. Last but not least, Russia's behaviour in its neighbourhood, especially the Russia–Georgia war increased Polish anxiety about future challenges from the east.²

The other V4 states share the Polish concerns, although because of their geographical location they are less vulnerable to any direct Russian military threat. The Czech Republic seems to be more sensitive about Russia than are Hungary or Slovakia. The Russian response to the plans to deploy U.S. missile radar in the Czech Republic, though later abandoned, strengthened the Czech perception that Russia may use political and military pressure to secure its interests.³ Key Czech national security documents implicitly express concerns about Russian attempts to build spheres of influence "through a combination of political, economic and military pressure and intelligence activities".⁴

Hungary and Slovakia in recent years have not had any disagreement with Russia that involved the military dimension. The stabilisation of their direct neighbourhood—the Western Balkans—was higher on their security agendas. Furthermore, because their dependency on energy supplies from Russia is higher than it is for Poland or the Czech Republic, they have avoided creating political tensions with Russia. Despite these differences, Hungary and Slovakia share the Polish and Czech perception that traditional risks in Europe have not altogether disappeared. Both countries are aware that a worsening of the security situation of Poland would have a direct impact on their security.

Prospects for Change in the Next Decade

The security perception of the V4 states in the next decade will be greatly influenced by developments in the global security environment. The end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2014 does not mean NATO will enjoy the dividend of an operation-free Alliance. The developments in North Africa after the Arab Spring or in the Middle East may force NATO members to engage in further out-of-area operations. The developments related to the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes may alter the threat perception held by NATO members, including the Visegrad states.

Changes in the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region may also influence NATO's security. In the coming years the U.S. might be forced to further decrease its military presence in Europe, pressuring European states to take greater responsibility for their defence and the stability of Europe and its direct neighbourhood. Also, European states, including the Visegrad countries, might face the dilemma of whether and how they should provide support to the U.S. and its Asian allies if needed.

² For more, see: R. Sikorski, "Russia and the Security of Poland: Our Reset Button", a speech given at the Center for American Progress in Washington D.C., 1 March 2011, www.msz.gov.pl

³ M. Schneider, "Russian Threats of Nuclear Targeting, Including First or Pre-emptive Uses of Nuclear Forces", appendix to K. B. Payne, "Prepared Testimony before the United States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development", 25 July 2012, www.appropriations.senate.gov

⁴ "Security Strategy of the Czech Republic", 2011, par. 19; "The White Paper of Defence", Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2011, par. 2.34.

Absent a breakthrough leading to an increase in mutual trust and confidence between Russia and NATO, Russia will continue to play a role in V4 security considerations. The V4 countries probably will not disregard the possibility that during a period with an unexpected concentration of challenges to the Alliance, Russia might exploit the moment to shape the European security architecture according to its own wishes. Scenarios involving Russian incursions into Latvia or Estonia to “defend” Russian citizens, Russian demands of a corridor to Kaliningrad via Lithuania, or the threat to use short range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to intimidate Poland cannot be entirely disregarded. Facing so many uncertainties in the next decade, the Visegrad states’ threat perceptions most probably will be influenced by more or less the likely “worst-case scenarios”. These will influence the V4’s views of the requirements of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture.

Assessment of the Credibility of NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture

The Visegrad countries have limited capabilities to tackle all the possible challenges to their security. For the V4 states, a strong and credible NATO that provides an enduring link between Europe and the U.S. remains the best possible security guarantee. The V4 states recognise they are as secure as probably never before in their history. While being aware of their comfortable situation, they, however, are carefully watching for any trends that may change that. In recent years, the V4 states have expressed concerns that their security needs are not fully taken into consideration by the other NATO Allies.⁵

The V4 states have foremost expressed concerns about the shape of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—mainly about the ability of other NATO members to come to their defence in case of a crisis. They were satisfied that the 2010 Strategic Concept re-confirmed NATO’s core function of collective defence even as it adapts to new and emerging challenges. However, in the V4 view, apart from declarations that NATO should undertake practical deeds that demonstrate its readiness to perform Article 5 missions, they have underlined the need for routinely updated contingency plans, regular military exercises, including live exercises that test the plans in practice, and reliable capabilities to provide and receive reinforcements in times of crises. Among the V4 states, Poland especially has put a strong emphasis on the practical provision of “visible reassurance” of all NATO members.⁶

The V4’s concerns have also been related to NATO’s focus on out-of-area operations. In recent years, officials from the region have expressed anxiety that NATO’s military capabilities and its training programme have been shaped by the requirements of the counter-insurgency conflict in Afghanistan because such specialisation would be of limited value in a potential high-intensity territorial defence mission.⁷ Officials from the V4 states claimed that “the ‘foreign legion only’ principle of expeditionary forces will not be sustainable” and advocated for rebalancing NATO’s approach.⁸ The often repeated argument in the V4 capitals was the belief that whether they are secure at home determines their ability to project stability and uphold security interests elsewhere in the world.

⁵ See also: Ł. Kulesa, “Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Central Europe”, in: B. Tertrais (ed.), “Perspectives on Extended Deterrence”, *Researches and Documents*, no. 3/2010, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.

⁶ For more, see: J. Durkalec, “NATO Defence and Deterrence Posture: Central and Eastern European Perspectives”, *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 29, May 2012.

⁷ S. Koziej, “Pierwsza dekada funkcjonowania w strukturach bezpieczeństwa NATO i UE—strategiczne doświadczenia Polski”, *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 22, Warszawa 2012, p. 32. For more about different requirements for territorial defence and out of area missions, see: R. L. Kugler, “NATO Military Requirements for Territorial Defense and Expeditionary Operations—Similarities And Differences”, www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/NATO_SEMINAR%20FOUR%20%20WORKING%20PAPERS.pdf.

⁸ A. Vondra, “The Transatlantic Bargain in 2012: Still a Good Deal?”, speech given at the Atlantic Council, January 24, 2012.

Second, the V4 have expressed concerns about the practical implementation of Article 4—consultations within NATO about developments that may influence the security of its members. There were apprehensions that NATO would not be able to rapidly reach consensus about providing assistance in case of an unexpected and limited-scale military attack.⁹ Also, Poland and the Czech Republic especially have advocated for consultations within NATO about the impact on the security of all of the Allies of the acquisition of modern military equipment and technologies by countries outside the Alliance. Their initiative to a large extent results from concerns that some NATO members were selling such equipment to Russia.¹⁰

Third, the V4 states' overall perspective on NATO has been influenced by European shortcomings in implementation of Article 3, which encompasses the commitment of all of the allies to maintain and develop their individual and collective defence capacities. The economic downturn of recent years has led to an uncoordinated and not sufficiently transparent process of reductions in budgets and force structure in NATO Europe. A worrisome trend has been that such reductions have happened contrary to the capability targets that had been accepted as part of NATO's defence planning process.¹¹ The V4 states were concerned that as a result of such cuts, NATO may lose its unprecedented military edge in capabilities, skills and expertise and would have to lower its Level of Ambition—the overall number, scale and nature of the operations the Alliance should be able to conduct at any one time.

The V4 states' perception was influenced by the shifting focus of U.S. foreign and defence policy to Asia-Pacific and U.S. criticism of the level of European NATO members' contributions to the Alliance. The V4 states became anxious that without proper European defence expenditures, the U.S. may lose interest in NATO.

The V4 states seemed to be aware that they have also contributed to the growing discrepancy between the European and U.S. contributions to the Alliance. Between 2008 and 2010, real defence spending in Hungary fell by 17.6%, in the Slovak Republic by 16.4%, and in the Czech Republic by 6.1%. In 2011, the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) have dropped between 1.1 and 1.3%. Because the impact of the financial crisis has been smaller in Poland it was in a far better situation. Under national law it is obliged to spend 1.95% GDP on defence. Between 2008 and 2010, its defence expenditures grew by 22.3%.¹² To enhance the credibility of the V4 states, in April 2012 the foreign and defence ministers of the V4 states issued the joint declaration "Responsibility for a Strong NATO" in which they declared an intent to "shoulder their share of responsibility for maintaining a coherent and effective NATO".¹³

NATO's DDPR and Beyond: Advantageous Words but Uncertain Deeds

The V4 states coordinated their positions during the intra-NATO debate about the overall "mix of capabilities" that NATO requires in order to tackle challenges in an uncertain

⁹ Some officials from the region still refer to a situation from 2003 when NATO members had difficulties in taking decisions to provide support to Turkey against potential missile threats from Iraq. See: S. Koziej, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–32.

¹⁰ For example, concerns were produced by the sales to Russia of French Mistral-class ships and the building of a state-of-the-art training centre in Russia by German company Rheinmetall.

¹¹ See more: J. Shea, "Keeping NATO Relevant", *Policy Outlook*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 6, www.carnegieendowment.org.

¹² *The Military Balance 2012*, *op. cit.*, Table 8: NATO Europe Gross Government Debt and Real Defence Expenditure 2008–10, p. 7; Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 13 April 2012, Table 3: Defence Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, p. 6.

¹³ "Responsibility for a Strong NATO", *Declaration of the Visegrad Group*, 18 April 2012, www.mzv.cz.

strategic environment.¹⁴ NATO's DDPR generally met their expectations; however, much will depend on DDPR's practical implementation.

Nuclear Forces

The approach of the V4 states is not identical. They differ slightly on the most controversial issue in a NATO nuclear debate—the future of the deployment in five European countries of about 180 U.S. B-61 nuclear gravity bombs.¹⁵

Poland has been the most active player from the region in the NATO nuclear debate.¹⁶ It put the greatest emphasis on the role of U.S. NSNW as bargaining chips in potential negotiations between the U.S. and Russia. Polish officials have avoided any direct references to the value of U.S. weapons based in Europe and have focused on highlighting opportunities and paths for change rather than the benefits of the status quo. Together with Norway, Poland has vocally supported the idea of further reductions of U.S. NSNW in Europe in a step-by-step process that involves Russian reciprocal steps.

The Czech Republic and Hungary remain the only countries in the region whose national security strategies refer to the importance of NATO's nuclear posture.¹⁷ In contrast to Poland, they have more openly emphasised the need for U.S. NSNW in Europe, owing to their belief in the continuing political and security value of those weapons. For example, according to a Hungarian official, "the forward-deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and existing nuclear burden-sharing arrangements are important embodiments of the transatlantic relationship".¹⁸

Slovak officials have not been vocal about NATO's nuclear policy. The reason for that is their lesser experience and expertise in this field than the Visegrad states that joined NATO earlier as well as the less political interest they hold in them than Poland.¹⁹ Even so, Slovakia subscribed to the joint V4 declaration that outlined the group's common approach to NATO's nuclear policy. The declaration in a broad manner expresses support for continuing the presence of U.S. NSNW in Europe. At the same time, in reflecting an approach promoted by Poland, it advocates "NATO's readiness and willingness to engage Russia on the basis of reciprocity on all topics, including transparency of tactical nuclear weapons".²⁰

¹⁴ In addition to the Joint Declaration, the goals for the Chicago summit were discussed during the meeting of presidents from the Visegrad States on 5 and 6 May, and a meeting of defence ministers on 4 May 2012. See: *Tygodnik BBN*, no. 4, 3–9 May 2012, pp. 4–5, www.bbn.gov.pl/.

¹⁵ B-61 storage sites are thought to be located in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey.

¹⁶ See: C. Bildt, R. Sikorski, "Next, The Tactical Nukes", *New York Times*, 1 February 2010; J.G. Store, R. Sikorski, "Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Norway and Poland", Oslo, Norway, 9 April 2010; "Non-paper submitted by Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands about increasing transparency and confidence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe", Berlin, Germany, 14 April 2011; R. Sikorski, "Why the West needs a New START", *The Guardian*, 20 November 2010, guardian.co.uk; R. Sikorski, J.G. Store, "NATO, Russia and Tactical Nuclear Arms", *The New York Times*, 14 May 2012.

¹⁷ "Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2011", par. 51. Hungarian National Security Strategy 2012, par. 28 b.

¹⁸ P. Siklosi, "NATO Summit in Chicago—Hungarian Perspective", *Transatlantic Files*, 1/2012, p. 9, cenaa.org For the Czech stance, see: Jiri Sedivy, Eva Svobodova, "Czech expectations for the Chicago Summit", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, vol. 21, issue 1, Winter 2012, pp. 13–14;

¹⁹ Interview with a Slovak official at NATO HQ, October 2012.

²⁰ "Responsibility for a Strong NATO", *op. cit.*

To some extent NATO's DDPR met those expectations.²¹ DDPR, however, did not resolve all of the questions related to nuclear issues. Taking into account the hesitant approach of Russia to even discuss non-strategic nuclear weapons with NATO, the long-term commitment of all NATO members to seek reciprocal Russian actions seems uncertain. Political pressure within the European states that host U.S. weapons may increase pressure leading to changes in the number and locations of U.S. NSNW in Europe. Furthermore, it is not impossible that the substantial costs of extending the life of the U.S. B-61 nuclear gravity bombs (estimated currently at \$10 billion a year) might force the U.S. to reconsider the number it maintains of these weapons—including bombs based in Europe—even before an agreement with Russia can be reached.²²

Furthermore, the DDPR's requirement that Russia reciprocate may be interpreted differently within NATO. There might be different views about what Russian steps would allow for significant reductions in NATO's NSNW. Some states may be more flexible than the V4 states in defining tradeoffs between NATO and Russia in this area.²³

Conventional Capabilities

For the V4 states, conventional forces seem to be the most important element of NATO's overall mix of capabilities. The V4 states supported a broad scope for DDPR as they were concerned that if the discussion focused solely on nuclear issues it would have distracted attention from the issue of conventional forces. Nuclear weapons are seen as assurance against the most unlikely existential threats, and robust conventional forces are perceived as needed to tackle more likely scenarios.

The V4 states got their wish as the DDPR underscored that NATO's conventional forces should be able to conduct a wide range of tasks, including high-intensity combat operations. It also included the commitment of NATO members to sustain conventional weapons at an adequate level, even with the ongoing financial crisis, and iterated the importance of re-invigorating the NATO Response Force (NRF). Further, it highlighted the importance of "visible assurances" for all NATO Allies, including the role of joint training and exercises. Last but not least, the DDPR recognised the need for reviewing the consequences of the acquisition of modern military technologies by states outside the Alliance.²⁴ That may open the way for consultation on transfers of such technologies from NATO members to third states such as Russia.

Nonetheless, the positive declarations by NATO members may not transform into reality, especially in times of financial crises. The 2013 "Steadfast Jazz" military exercises in October 2013 in Poland and the Baltic States will be the first test of the NATO members' commitment. Even if their participation is robust, the costs of these exercise may influence similar events in the future.

The next few years will also reveal whether the implementation of the U.S. pledge to conduct exercises in Alliance territories during rotational deployments of a battalion-sized taskforce to Europe will work. Also, they will show whether other expected forms of "visible

²¹ "Deterrence and Defence Posture Review", *NATO Press Release (2012) 063*, issued on 20 May 2012, par. 25 and 27, www.nato.int.

²² E.M. Grossman, "Pentagon Official Blames U.S. Bomb Cost Hike on 'Incomplete' DOE Agency Estimate", *Global Security Newswire*, 3 August 2012, www.nti.org/gsn.

²³ For more about possible V4 expectations related to Russian reciprocity, see: J. Durkalec, "After the DDPR: Central and Eastern European Perspectives", in: A. Berger, H. Chalmers, M. Chalmers (ed.), "A Problem Deferred? NATO Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons after Chicago", *Whitehall Report*, 4-12, RUSI, October 2012, pp. 45–53.

²⁴ "Deterrence and Defence Posture Review", *op. cit.*, par. 34.

assurances", such as the U.S. Aviation Detachment's support of rotational deployment of U.S. military aircraft to Poland—will become a standard element of the regional security landscape.

The DDPR does not seem to resolve the divergent perspectives within NATO about priorities in capability development. For example, during the Chicago Summit, Poland advocated the need for "heavier" military capabilities that may be required in some territorial defence scenarios.²⁵ In tough economic times, efforts to find a balance between different sets of capabilities may be difficult.

Missile Defence

NATO territorial missile defence (MD) has been regarded by the V4 as "another core element of NATO's collective defence".²⁶ The announcement of Interim Capability was seen as a political message that NATO is making steady progress with the project.

The V4 share the perspective that NATO should proceed with building the system even amid Russian protests, which they find unjustified. At the same time, they are interested in overcoming the current deadlock between NATO and Russia. They have supported a number of incentives offered by NATO to Russia, such as a proposal to jointly create early-warning-and-response-coordination centres, or joint theatre exercises involving MD.

If the MD system is completed, Poland will provide the biggest contribution to it (of the V4 states) as it will host elements of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). As part of phase III of the EPAA, Poland sometime around 2018 will host a base with SM-3 IIA interceptors, and as part of phase IV, sometime around 2020, it will have the more capable SM-3 IIB interceptors. The contributions of the other V4 states will be limited to participation in the common funding of the command-and-control element.

The NATO territorial MD system, along with the U.S. EPAA as its main component, is important for the V4 states for several reasons. Although it seems highly unlikely that Iran would strike V4 territories with ballistic missiles, these states stress that all NATO allied territory should be protected in the same manner. Also, in their view, it strengthens the transatlantic link at a time of decreasing conventional U.S. presence in Europe. For Poland, the deployment of the U.S. SM-3 site will be an achievement of one of its strategic objectives: hosting on its territory a permanent U.S. military installation that provides a direct link between Polish security and the defence of other NATO members.

The V4 states have been cautious about overemphasising the role of MD. They were satisfied that the DDPR underscored that MD would play only a supplementary role to nuclear weapons in deterrence, and highlighted that granting a more central role to MD is a matter for the future.

The V4 states also recognise that the future of MD is contingent upon many unknowns. According to the Lisbon Summit Declaration, the system will be developed by taking into account "the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance".²⁷ Similarly, the timeframes and completion of the EPAA depends on the Iranian ballistic missile threat and the availability of proven and cost-effective technologies. The fiscal situation and political priorities in the U.S.

²⁵ P. Pietrzak, "Szczyt NATO w Chicago—determinanty, oczekiwania i rezultaty", *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–61. According to RAND experts, by the post-2015 timeframe, because of defence cuts in Europe, Polish forces may have the largest heavy forces in NATO Europe outside of Turkey. For more, see: F.S. Larrabee (et al.), *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, RAND 2012, p. 76, footnote 3.

²⁶ "Responsibility for a Strong NATO", *op. cit.*

²⁷ "Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on 20 November 2010", par. 36.

likely will influence its future decisions. It also cannot be excluded that Russian objections may impact current missile defence plans, especially any deployment to Poland.²⁸

Scenarios for the Future

In the next decade NATO members will take many decisions that will shape the further transformation of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. Several scenarios for NATO's "overall mix of capabilities" can be imagined.

One scenario that seems most desirable to the V4 states is a process of increased transparency and building trust with Russia that would lead by 2020 to reciprocal reductions in NSNW and a verifiable withdrawal of the Russian nuclear arsenal away from the Polish border. Uncertainties related to Russian NSNW would cease to play any role in the V4 states' considerations about the further stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. The final decision about NATO's nuclear posture would be dependent on security developments in other regions adjacent to Europe, mainly the Middle East. At the same time, the U.S. and NATO may find agreement with Russia on MD (including the deployment of U.S. SM-3s in Poland) and on a new design for conventional arms control. Also, agreements with Russia would be achieved in a way that enables NATO to retain its full spectrum of conventional capabilities. More importantly, the achievement of a stable security equilibrium in the Euro-Atlantic area would enable NATO and Russia to increase their cooperation in tackling common security challenges.

For this scenario to happen is contingent upon many uncertain actions, such as the ability of NATO to maintain a cohesive approach in seeking Russian transparency and reciprocity with regards to NSNW, finding innovative solutions to the current deadlock between NATO and Russia in nuclear and conventional arms control and missile defence, or the reversal of the current defence cuts by European NATO members. Within NATO, the most influential role will be that of the U.S. as a driving force in this process.

The V4 states can, however, influence the overall process. To increase their impact on NATO decision-making they could more visibly demonstrate that they share the fiscal and political burdens of the Alliance's security. The V4 states' contribution to NATO's deterrence and defence posture should become more visible. Also, the V4 states could seek creative solutions on how to build trust between NATO and Russia on nuclear, conventional and MD capabilities.

Without the active engagement of the V4 states, outcomes less beneficial for them are likely. In 2020, the situation may look similar to today: the presence of some U.S. NSNW in Europe would continue to spark controversies, the credibility of the Alliance's conventional force posture would pose doubts, and MD would continue to be disputed. A scenario of forced, domestic-politics driven or fiscal-influenced changes in NATO's nuclear posture before 2020 is also possible. In such a case, the best possible outcome for the V4 states would be to seek changes in NATO that are gradual and made in accordance with a "roadmap" agreed by all Allies. For example, a step-by-step process for the removal of nuclear weapons would be balanced by more or less a symbolic increase in conventional "visible reassurances" to Central and Eastern European states. But even in such a case in which any discontent by the V4 states would to some extent be mitigated, the Visegrad states' anxiety over Russian nuclear forces and the future of the Alliance will remain.

²⁸ For more, see: J. Durkalec, "NATO Missile Defence: in Search of a Broader Role", *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, vol. 21, issue 1, Winter 2012.

The Future of NATO's Defence and Deterrence Posture: the Baltic States Perspective

Kaarel Kaas

The Security Environment and Threat Perceptions

All three of the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—share an official security paradigm, which focuses on the view that the entire security environment in the Baltic Sea region has gained significantly from both the enlargement of NATO and accession to the EU in 2004. Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius are convinced that the Baltic Sea region is one of the most stable and peaceful regions in the world today.

This understanding prevalent in the Baltic States is also reflected in their national security concepts and strategies, the current versions of which were adopted between 2010 and 2012.¹ In essence, these documents subscribe to a comprehensive approach to security. Security threats and challenges are perceived as transnational, and the security of the NATO countries, as indivisible. For this reason, any unforeseen or rapidly escalating international crises could affect the security situation in the Baltic States even if the actual crisis is not in their vicinity.²

The threats and challenges identified by the Baltic nations include international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; transnational organised crime; the global economic recession and financial crises; the effects of climate change; energy dependency and the exploitation of energy assets for political purposes; cyberattacks and terrorism; and attempts by hostile external actors to influence domestic or foreign policy and economic decisions.³

Although at present the official position of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is that the threat of a direct military attack is not likely in the foreseeable future, the Baltic States still emphasise that conventional military threats cannot be fully excluded in the long term. In addition, shows of force, such as extensive military exercises in the region or the deployment of forces in the immediate vicinity of their borders during a political crisis, could be used as instruments to increase political pressure on these countries.

Against this backdrop, Russia is perceived as the key source of potential instability in the region. The Baltic States have taken the view that since the second half of the 1990s, Russia has tried to actively intervene in their domestic politics, engaged in aggressive intelligence operations against them and constantly pressured them in the international arena. These activities, although they are detrimental to relations, have not been considered a direct or significant security threat and have been accepted by the Baltic States as 'routine' practices of Russian foreign policy.

¹ The National Security Concept of Estonia was adopted by the *Riigikogu* in May 2010; the National Security Concept of Latvia was approved by the *Saeima* in March 2011; the National Security Strategy of Lithuania was approved by the *Seimas* in June 2012. The documents are available, respectively, at www.vm.ee/eng, www.mfa.gov.lv/en and www.urm.lt.

² B. Ljung, T. Malmlöf, K. Neretnieks, M. Winnerstig (ed.), *The Security and Defensibility of the Baltic States—A Comprehensive Analysis of a Security Complex in the Making*, FOI, Stockholm, 2012, pp. 24–25.

³ R. Kaljurand, K. Neretnieks, B. Ljung, J. Tupay, "Developments in the Security Environment of the Baltic Sea Region up to 2020," *ICDS Report*, September 2012, pp. 36–44, www.icds.ee.

During the past five years, however, there have been three events that have fuelled a feeling of insecurity about Russia in the Baltic States. In 2007, a statue commemorating Soviet soldiers in World War II—the so called Bronze Soldier—was moved to a new location in Tallinn, which sparked mass riots accompanied by extensive cyberattacks against Estonian government agencies, the banking sector and mass media. It was suspected that Russian authorities were directly or indirectly involved in the organisation of the cyberattacks and the riots.⁴

In 2008, Russia and Georgia fought a war that the Baltic States interpreted as proof of Russia's readiness and capability to use, if necessary, conventional military force against its neighbours and to employ military force as an instrument of its political objectives. Before 2008, the likelihood of a state-to-state conflict erupting in Europe in the 21st century had been estimated by the Baltic security and foreign policy elite to be largely hypothetical.

In autumn 2009, Russia simultaneously conducted two large-scale operational-strategic military exercises—Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009—in the European part of the country. These were the most extensive exercises ever held since the collapse of the Soviet Union, covering an area extending from Kaliningrad and Belarus in the south to the Russian-Norwegian border in the north.⁵

The manoeuvres involved a full-scale military operation against a conventional enemy in the Baltic operational theatre, cutting off the Baltic States from the rest of the NATO countries and culminated with a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw.⁶ Moreover, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces carried out a large-scale exercise simultaneously with Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009.⁷

In addition, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius are concerned about recently updated content in Russia's strategic documents, regional changes implemented within the framework of Russian military reform and the deployment of new weapons systems in the Baltic Sea region. Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020, approved in the spring of 2009, states that the orientation of the current security architecture towards "the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, especially in the Euro-Atlantic sphere," poses an increasing threat to international security, while attempts to "extend the Alliance's military infrastructure" to Russia's borders are unacceptable and continue to shape the relationship between Russia and NATO.⁸

According to the new version of Russia's Military Doctrine, approved in February 2010, the key external military risks ("voennaia opasnost") for Russia include, above all, attempts to give NATO forces global functions, the building of NATO infrastructure close to Russia and the Alliance's enlargement to areas next to Russia's borders.⁹

The military reform launched in 2008 has increased the numbers and capabilities of various Russian armed forces units in the Baltic neighbourhood; furthermore, completely new units have been set up. At the moment, there are two motorised rifle brigades, one air-assault division, one special-forces brigade, one artillery brigade and one missile brigade in the immediate vicinity of Estonia's borders. The Kaliningrad exclave next to Lithuania hosts one

⁴ "Russia's Involvement in the Tallinn Disturbances," *ICDS Overview*, May 2007, www.icds.ee.

⁵ K. Kaas, "Words and Steel," *Postimees*, 19 September 2009. English translation available at www.icds.ee.

⁶ "Baltic Blues: Stop Whingeing," *Eastern approaches—The Economist*, 17 September 2009, "War games," *The Economist*, 29 October 2009. www.economist.com.

⁷ K. Kaas, *op. cit.*

⁸ "Strategia natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda" *Security Council of the Russian Federation*, 12 May 2009, www.scrf.gov.ru.

⁹ "Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii", *Administration of the President of the Russian Federation*, 5 February 2010, www.kremlin.ru.

motorised rifle brigade, one motorised rifle regiment, one naval infantry brigade, one naval special-forces brigade, one artillery brigade and one missile brigade.¹⁰

The missile brigade stationed in close proximity to Estonia was re-equipped with Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) surface-to-surface short range ballistic missiles in 2010–2011.¹¹ By the end of 2012, the missile brigade in Kaliningrad should also be armed with similar missiles.¹² The Iskander-M has a range of up to 500 km. By the beginning of 2013, the missile brigades in Kaliningrad and the neighbourhood of Lake Peipus will be able to target most of Poland's territory, all of the Baltic States and most of southern Finland. The Iskander-M is a dual-use weapons system that can carry either a conventional warhead or a tactical nuclear warhead of 5–50 kilotons.¹³

In the spring of 2012, the air defence missile regiment in Kaliningrad was equipped with S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) long-range air-defence missile systems.¹⁴ The S-400 Triumf system can cover up to 400 km, allowing for an air defence "umbrella" from Poland to southern Latvia. The Iskanders and the presence of effective long-range air-defence systems in the region could complicate and slow down the arrival of NATO reinforcement troops in the Baltic States in the event of a crisis.

The new weapons systems have been deployed in the Baltic Sea region as part of an ambitious re-armament and modernisation programme for the Russian armed forces. Increased military power is a key priority for Russia's current political leadership, which has allocated significant financial resources for this purpose. The efforts to achieve this objective are two-fold: its forces are to be equipped with new technology and weapons while the army undergoes comprehensive reform, which was launched in 2008. Although the first stage of this reform has been successfully completed, the outcome of all the changes is still unknown.

Regardless, it is highly probable that Russia's military capabilities—both in their entirety and in the immediate vicinity of the Baltic States—will increase during the next decade, provided that the present government stays in place. A strong response by the authorities to a surge in opposition activities, officials hasty efforts to reinforce their positions and the reluctance demonstrated by the majority of Russian society to risk a public and possibly violent confrontation with the powers that be indicate the prevailing probability of the persistence of the political system created by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The present political elite in Russia perceives the West, and NATO in particular, as its geopolitical rivals or, worse still, enemies.

At the same time, however, the capability of NATO's European Allies to mount conventional military operations will decrease in the next decade if most of the NATO member states do not boost their defence budgets. NATO's capability to launch military operations could be further undermined by the U.S. "pivot" towards Asia and additional withdrawals of U.S. troops from Europe.

In juxtaposition, these factors create a situation in which the only substantial military risk that may affect the Baltic States during the next 10 years stems from a scenario in which Russia would try to test the Alliance's resolve by putting on a show of military force. At the moment, the probability of this scenario unfolding is low.

¹⁰ Data compiled by ICDS from various Russian sources: nvo.ng.ru, mdb.cast.ru, www.cast.ru, www.mil.ru, www.warfare.ru, www.ryadovoy.ru, Interfax-AVN.

¹¹ "Leningradskij voennyj okrug poluchil pervyj raketnyj kompleks 'Iskander'," *Vzglyad*, 17 July 2010, www.vz.ru; "Leningradi sõjaväeringkond varustatakse Iskanderitega," *Interfax-BNS*, 25 February 2010.

¹² "Russia to deploy Iskander Missiles in Kaliningrad Region in 2nd half of 2012," *Interfax-AVN*, 25 January 2012.

¹³ "9K720 Iskander—SS-26 STONE," 31 March 2009, <http://military.tomsk.ru/blog/topic-185.html>.

¹⁴ D. Telmanov, "Baltijskij flot vooruzhili kompleksom S-400 'Triumf,'" *Izvestiya*, 6 April 2012.

In terms of military geography, the Baltic States form a common operational space that resembles a peninsula stretching from Poland to the Gulf of Finland. The length of the “peninsula” from north to south (along the coastline of the Baltic Sea) is about 700 km, and its width from east to west (from Russia’s or Belarus’s borders to the coast of the Baltic Sea) is about 200–400 km.

The Baltic States not only share a number of similarities but they also exhibit certain differences. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all have small populations and territories, which means they lack operational depth if a military conflict occurs. Furthermore, the armed forces of all three Baltic nations are negligible in size, so their initial self-defence capability is limited.

Estonia is the only nation among the three that has retained the model of reserve forces based on conscription to develop a wartime operational structure for primarily territorial defence. Both Latvia and Lithuania have opted for a national defence system that relies on a small, professional army supported by a volunteer, part-time national guard.

Estonia’s defence expenditure amounts to 2% GDP, while Latvia and Lithuania linger significantly below the threshold required by NATO—in 2012, their defence expenditures were 0.8% and 1.0% GDP, respectively. Nevertheless, both have established a clear objective to reach the 2% level during the next decade.

Lithuania is the only Baltic country that has a common land border with a NATO member state (the Lithuanian–Polish border of about 120 km). Geographically speaking, Lithuania looks as if it is wedged between Kaliningrad, a part of Russia, and Belarus, which is a close ally of Russia. Both Estonia and Latvia share long land and sea borders with Russia and Latvia has a land border with Belarus. Unlike Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have populations with influential Russian-speaking minorities, including significant numbers of Russian citizens.

An Assessment of the Credibility of NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture

The Baltic nations gave a joint positive response to the outcome of the Lisbon Summit and the Alliance’s new strategic concept. As NATO’s core mission, Article 5 received the attention it deserved (according to the Baltic States) and was embraced as a successful compromise. In addition, the document showcased the need to bolster the Alliance’s role in non-conventional security issues, for example, in energy security and cyber security—this role was also on the Baltics’ wish list.¹⁵

Moreover, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania welcomed the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), which was completed in 2012. The DDPR once again emphasised that the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect the territories and populations of NATO member states, as set out in Article 5. It also included a declaration that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”¹⁶

The Baltic countries believe that NATO’s collective defence guarantees are credible, the more so since the Alliance has extended contingency planning to the three states and has conducted extensive exercises in the region to practise the implementation of the plans. Still, the Baltic nations need affirmation that if a crisis erupts the contingency plans will be quickly and smoothly activated and the Alliance’s assurance measures will be introduced in the region in the early stages of the crisis. A rapid reaction is crucial for the Baltics.

However, a negative assessment was given to the divide between the priorities and the viewpoints of the European allies regarding the DDPR, which could lead to the risk that NATO’s policies will fragment, especially those related to tactical nuclear weapons. While Germany, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands would prefer such weapons to be abolished in Europe, the Baltic States, together with Poland and the Czech Republic, have so far taken the position

¹⁵ B. Ljung, T. Malmlöf, K. Neretnieks, M. Winnerstig (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁶ “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,” *NATO Press Release*, 20 May 2012, www.nato.int.

that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons should be coupled to Russian reciprocity in this matter.¹⁷

It has been alleged that Russia transferred nuclear arms to the Kaliningrad Oblast in 2001.¹⁸ Also, Lithuania has repeatedly expressed its concern about tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Kaliningrad.¹⁹ These kinds of weapons play a central role in Russian military thinking because of the relative weakness of the country's conventional forces compared to NATO's military capabilities. Tactical nuclear weapons compensate for Russia's current military inferiority. Unlike NATO, however, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is not a mere theoretical possibility for Russia—their use is perceived as a military instrument that might be put into practice. So, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons formed not only part of the Zapad-2009 manoeuvres but also of the Vostok-2010 exercise conducted in Russia's far east, in territories adjacent to China's borders. According to the Vostok-2010 scenario, tactical nuclear weapons were used to stop an offensive by mechanised forces of an overwhelming conventional enemy.

Insofar as Russia's conventional capability in the Baltic Sea region will probably expand during the next 10 years while NATO's ability to undertake high-intensity conventional military operations either will not change or will decrease, the role of tactical nuclear weapons in securing the credibility of the Alliance's deterrence posture will continue to be significant over the next decade. Although the development of missile defence shields is considered to be beneficial for the maintenance and strengthening of the transatlantic link, the Baltic states estimate that their practical value for deterrent purposes is low.

Still, the key factor for the Baltic states is NATO's capability to react with conventional forces should a crisis arise, allowing the Alliance to demonstrate its resolve, to deter potential enemies and to raise the threshold of crisis eruption and escalation.

The capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to contribute to the establishment of their own credible military deterrence posture in the region will remain limited over the next decade. NATO's collective defence is, and will be vital for guaranteeing their national security.

The Way Forward for NATO

Taking into account that reductions in the armed forces of NATO member states are likely to continue, the pre-emptive deployment of ground forces, together with the use of air force units in the early stages of a crisis, is becoming more and more important when it comes to demonstrating NATO's resolve to defend the Baltic States.²⁰

This also has forced an increase in the significance of exercises focusing on host nation support and the prepositioning of equipment and weapons systems in the region. In addition to the existing Baltic air policing mission, the permanent stationing of small NATO contingents on the territories of the Baltic States could be another constructive step to be considered.

As for potential military operations in the Baltic operational space, NATO's capability to suppress or destroy enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) is crucial. Long-range air-defence systems, such as the Russian S-400s, not only pose a major threat to combat aircraft delivering munitions but also to, for example, JSTARS, AWACS and other aircraft that are critical to the success of every combat operation. SEAD capability could play a decisive role in a crisis

¹⁷ R. Kaljurand, K. Neretnieks, B. Ljung, J. Tupay, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹⁸ "Russia Transfers Nuclear Arms to Baltics," *The Washington Times*, 3 January 2001, www.washingtontimes.com.

¹⁹ "Russia Has Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Kaliningrad—Lithuanian DefMin," *The Lithuania Tribune*, 8 February 2011, www.lithuaniatribune.com.

²⁰ B. Ljung, T. Malmlöf, K. Neretnieks, M. Winnerstig (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 77.

because the small size of the Baltic territories means any response by the Alliance must be quick.

To sum up, the Alliance must have meaningful conventional military rapid-reaction capability, together with tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, to maintain the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltics over the next 10 years. It must be underscored that the Baltic States presently form the only region in NATO where the Alliance does not retain superiority in conventional capabilities in peacetime. It is unlikely that this situation will change in the upcoming decade.

In the Baltic Sea region, it is not possible to substitute NATO's military deterrence capability for political and trust-building measures, for example, in arms-control agreements. Members of Russia's current ruling political elite perceive NATO as a military risk and a potential enemy—this is a deep-rooted conviction that reflects their worldview. There is no reason to presume that this situation will change unless Russia undergoes a groundbreaking social and political transformation.

Moreover, previous regional arms-control agreements and regimes, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), have been rendered redundant by the capability to rapidly deploy military forces over strategic distances. Russia unilaterally suspended the application of the CFE Treaty in 2007. So far, all negotiations to revive the treaty have run into sand because Russia lacks the political will to solve the problem.

Leaving aside the issue of how probable it is that a new instrument will be found to fill the gap left by the suspension of the CFE Treaty, it must be kept in mind that by their very nature all arms-control regimes are but confidence-building measures that cannot replace deterrence.

The Future of NATO'S Defence and Deterrence Posture: a View from Romania

Dana Marca

This article is a follow-up to a debate on the role of nuclear weapons in 21st century, with a special focus on NATO's nuclear deterrence and posture.¹ The discussion has been somewhat marked by calls for nuclear disarmament, resting on various rationales, including the provocative nature of nuclear weapons, their lack of relevance in defence terms considering their atrocious impact, the potential for arms races, danger of accidents resulting in disaster, threat of nuclear terrorism and financial constraints.

As I embark on answering the questions posed by the publisher, I stress one caveat that will be underlying my analysis: a new world order is being negotiated, and a wide spectrum of subsequent transformations is in full motion. The key to any undertakings in current circumstances rests on an accurate assessment of the limitations imposed by this state of affairs.

By and large, I would sum up the situation as one of significant instability characterised by a lack of clarity of official positions, mutual testing through public statements, all aimed at maintaining the balance (by some) or/and challenging the status quo (by others). This is the main reason why I deem the quest for arms control and disarmament measures as an untimely undertaking under the current circumstances. I firmly believe in the tremendous role that arms control and disarmament can play in shaping strategic conditions in the 21st century. However, for successful negotiations of such arrangements a prerequisite is the political will to accommodate each other. As long as the overall bargaining over power sharing is not settled, the political will for compromise is lacking, and thus strategic circumstances do not offer conditions for closing arms control arrangements.

We may assume that 2013 will be one of those "make it or break it" years. While 2012 has been characterised by electoral processes, once the newly elected leaders take office they will have to define their positions towards each other and on specific topics of common interest.

This article is intended to convey the need for more regional ownership in the process of establishing a power-sharing agreement and a grand-strategy to manage security affairs. This paper seeks to discuss—within the established scope—the changes in the current strategic environment, noting the potential and the responsibility for engagement of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states in Allied policy-making.

The relevance of such discussions is high, as CEE countries have placed NATO extended deterrence, along with the security guarantees embedded in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, at the centre of their defences. Furthermore, by signing onto the European Missile Defence programme, their strategic environment has been dramatically altered. They have the responsibility to ensure that Allied decisions reflect their own security needs, not only for their own benefit but also to certify their capacity to implement the decisions. Similarly, the Western capitals have the responsibility to hold back from assuming additional tasks for which NATO is not designed to handle. Striking a balance of the two approaches is a precondition for successful discussion about NATO's defence and deterrence posture.

¹ This article reflects the author's own views, and not the positions of other Forums or institutions to which the author may be connected.

Security Environment and NATO's Defence and Deterrence Posture

The Transformation

The current transformation is the result of momentum building over the course of some years. A paradigm shift from a unilateral to a multipolar structure of the international system has been called for by many European countries, but the proposal was formalised by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev during a visit to Germany (spring 2008), asking publicly for a "pan-European security architecture". He specifically mentioned the need for a place for Russia at the "decision-making table" when it comes to discussions of strategic global impact.

Various attempts have been made to develop a common vision: the U.S. "reset button policy"; the G7 expansions to the G8 to the G20; the OSCE launch of the "Corfu process" (2009); the EU launch of the "Meseberg initiative" (2010); and, a few NATO attempts to re-energise NATO–Russia relations within the NRC (NATO–Russia Council). In addition to those efforts, European capitals (Paris, Berlin, Ankara) have enhanced bilateral cooperation with Moscow.

In terms of security subsectors, we have witnessed a continuation of the trends activated at the end of the Cold War, with a shift of focus from traditional to new threats—inter-ethnic conflicts, illegal trafficking and criminal networks, terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states, and others. The transnational character of the threats and the risk of spill over effect are well-noted, and the debate on "out-of-area" missions has gained new momentum as a self-defence tool in a globalised world where terrorism is prominently on the agenda. As a result, NATO's scope and purpose has been redefined constantly to alter its defence and deterrence posture, placing greater emphasis on a wider spectrum of options to tackle the new threats.

A major alteration to the posture is in the role of nuclear forces within the framework of overall defence policy. Nuclear weapons have been assigned chiefly political value, with the main objective of the nuclear force shifting from "to defend" to "maintaining peace and stability, by preventing a potential attack and/or attempts to coercion by other actors" (deterrence). This emphasis on deterrence rather than defence implies that nuclear forces are not aimed at an opponent, while their perceived utility is preventive in nature (guarantees an unacceptable cost in retaliation for aggression). Accordingly, these conceptual modifications were followed by operational measures such as decreasing the number and physical posture of nuclear forces. Official documents illustrate the diminished relevance of nuclear weapons, a shift towards addressing new type of threats, articulating a new vision of security and a new Allied defence policy with regards to nuclear deterrence.² However, nuclear weapons' role in assuring the defence of Allied territory and people from both aggression and coercion has been preserved.

The picture has been completed by prominent cuts in conventional armaments, steep reductions in arsenals, increased transparency and confidence-building measures to ensure mutual trust. The overall concept, goals and instruments have been formalised in a series of arms-control agreements (TCFE, OST, CSBMs).

The entire transformation process can be tracked in public documents adopted at Allied meetings of ministers and summits as well as by communiqués issued by NATO's Secretary General. Some are simply statements, but others are programmatic documents announcing structural transformations. One such programmatic document is the new Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 at the NATO Summit in Lisbon.

This has been the first document of high relevance adopted in the 28-member format.³ For new NATO members this is highly important as it offered them the opportunity to

² "Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept", Article 46, 62–64.

³ The previous Strategic Concept was issued in 1999.

participate in the deliberative process led by the Albright Commission. Not only were their considerations taken into account in the Allied analysis but also their geostrategic particularities in terms of security vulnerabilities were included in the "initial assumptions" of the Allied analytical process.

As a result, the document issued by the Albright Commission brought to light a resolute statement on the preservation of NATO's core tasks and principles along with new approaches to be developed. Another announcement about the New Strategic Concept regards the adoption of European Missile Defence as a NATO programme in response to the ballistic missile proliferation threat from rogue states.⁴ The document defined having the capacity to defend Allied territory against a ballistic missile attack as one of the key elements of common defence and places the responsibility of building the system on all of the members.⁵

Once again, this approach has been viewed by the CEE states as critical, as in fact it is meant to transfer the political relevance of enlargement into the strategic planning realm by connecting a national priority to a multilateral framework. Countries in the region already have been involved in the development of European Missile Defence. Hence, its formal adoption as a NATO project synchronised a national priority with Allied strategic thinking. There are two main positive outcomes of this: first, it again confirms the indivisibility of security (hence, reassuring new members) and, second, it establishes premises for a multilateral dialogue with other actors (i.e., Russia).

The Challenge

Specific provisions have been embedded in the Lisbon documents with the goal to alleviate Moscow's concerns (e.g., on the exchange of information, consultations and complete transparency in relations with the Russian Federation). NATO documents mention the option of connecting the anti-ballistic missile systems of the U.S., NATO and Russia in due time,⁶ with a clear specification that the programme is not designed to defend against long-range ballistic missiles such as those in the Russian nuclear arsenal, but from an actual threat brought about by Iran's nuclear capabilities between now and 2015.

Regardless of the apparent willingness to reassure Russia and accommodate its requests, the topic has been constantly perceived by Russian officials as threatening. In March 2012, during the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, Medvedev (the out-going president at the time) stressed the necessity of consensus on missile defence.⁷ However, throughout this year's Russian presidential election, Vladimir Putin (prime minister at the time) declared that "A global balance of forces can be guaranteed either by building our own missile defence shield ... or by developing the ability to overcome any missile defence system and protect Russia's retaliation potential, which is far more effective".⁸ Because agreement on the matter was not reached by the 2012 NATO Summit held in Chicago, Russia decided not to take part in the event.

The deadlock is still present as of late 2012. This does not imply that either side is not interested in BMD or that any of them hold ill intentions. NATO countries favour a multilateral

⁴ S. Hildreth, C. Ek, "Missile Defence and NATO's Lisbon Summit", Congressional Research Service, 28 December 2010, p. 5.

⁵ C. Mostoflei, "Conceptul Strategic NATO-determinari si perspective", *Impact Strategic*, no. 37, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 16–17, available on the Center of Security and Defence Strategic Studies website at <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

⁶ N. Roman, "Scutul anti-racheta, componenta sensibila a noului Concept Strategic NATO", in: *Impactul evolutiei relatiilor internationale asupra mediului de securitate*, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Aparare si Securitate, Bucharest, 2010, p. 944.

⁷ M. Bennetts, "NATO Tells Russia Not to 'Waste Money' on Anti-Shield Deployment", *RIA NOVOSTI*, 26 March 2012, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20120326/172402648.html>.

⁸ V. Putin, "Being Strong", *Foreign Policy*, 21 February 2012, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong.

approach to European Missile Defence as an opportunity to engage Russia, and Moscow's interest in cooperation should be honest. However, such cooperation cannot be built in the absence of a strategic bargain. Moscow will not agree to transformations of the status quo unless it feels it has maximised the opportunity to redefine its position in the system.

Another example that reinforces this assessment is the deadlock in negotiations on the future of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In fact, most of the processes opened in recent years (mentioned previously) have not progressed. All of these topics are sectoral arrangements that cannot be implemented in the absence of a framework. Progress can be reached on individual projects only after the overall power-sharing arrangement has been settled.

Since this article is limited to NATO's defence and deterrence posture, most of the challenges indicated here are linked to Russia. However, the trend of challenging the current strategic arrangements has been reiterated by other countries as well in other fields, and I emphasise here that this is a global process and any reference to the one actor is solely the result of the limited scope of our subject.

The Way Forward for NATO—A Grand Strategy Is Needed

Since one of the questions posed by the editor regards NATO's credibility, a reality forgotten amongst the rhetorical speeches is that NATO is an instrument that embodies in strategic terms our common vision and goals. If we do not have a vision, it is we who lack credibility, not NATO.

In applying this to our theme, I would reiterate that as long as the power-sharing agreement is missing there will be no clarity in any of these endeavours. The Alliance has always been a set of organisational agreements reached at the strategic level, representing a mutually accepted power balance and terms of reference regarding cooperation and complementarity. If today we feel that some of NATO's instruments or policies do not answer a particular question, the fault needs to be sought at the strategic level.

While 2012 has been marked by electoral processes (in Russia, France and the U.S.), 2013 will compel new leaders (or newly invested in some cases) to define positions towards each other and on specific topics that have been generating controversy. NATO as such is not a player in the game. Nevertheless, the decisions adopted will inevitably shape the future of the Alliance. Hence, it is mandatory to identify ways to ensure that the overall game will not constrain options for the Alliance.

I believe the most important contribution would be if expert-level discussions were to carry on the process of introspection launched by the Albright Commission. This will extend the findings reached by the DDPR and other internal processes launched in Chicago. It should include the following:

First, an honest discussion about NATO's defence and deterrence posture has to take into account the agreed scope of the Alliance. Member states have the responsibility to define the scope of NATO action and to stop lamenting the Alliance's impotence in coping with threats or risks that are outside the agreed limits. The Alliance cannot be the panacea of the security sector, and cannot address each existing threat. At no point in time did the Allies agree that NATO should embark on a disarmament mission, even if such endeavours are critically important.

I find calls addressed to NATO regarding global disarmament are misplaced. While NATO's defence and deterrence posture should not be provocative, it still has to ensure the credibility of its core functions, namely, defence from aggression and coercion. Furthermore, WMDs remain a fact of strategic life. Nuclear proliferation, both from state and non-state actors, is a concern widely shared. As long as NATO aims at defending its state members (territory and

people), no analyst can argue that “blind” disarmament or “global zero” is a decision likely to be embraced by NATO.

More importantly, it is worth taking note that full or blind disarmament might stir up more trouble, as some NATO countries might feel vulnerable in the face of increasing WMD proliferation while lacking credible security guarantees.

Second, the discussions within NATO today illustrate the dissonance between the political discourse of the last two decades and the strategic reality of today. This is the result of many years marked by a rhetoric focused on political transformation processes but lacking a strategic foundation.

The perception of a diminished common threat led to a focus on national or regional priorities, while the common agenda was less demanding. Different geographic locations and geostrategic positions generated different priorities in coping with the various threats. While grounding speeches in the political reality of common values, the effort to reach solid agreement on specific strategic realities has been diminished, pending on their degree of urgency. The Alliance has mainly focused on enlargement policy and partnerships, emphasising the transformative role of the Alliance in using soft power to pursue regime change in support of democratic values. While much effort was devoted to designing democratic reforms, other topics were discussed on a case-by-case basis. This approach lacked the strategic guidance needed for the operational field.

Against this background, the successive rounds of enlargement brought new members into the club, with evident differences between East and West, old members and new.

The lack of effort to integrate all of these trends has impeded on NATO's ability to project a “Grand Strategy”. It seems that mostly real-life challenges have triggered reactions from the Alliance. In order to have a firm impact on the international relations scene, it is necessary to have a collective vision, purpose and strategy founded on a shared “Grand Strategy”.

This in turn requires collective agreement on a comprehensive picture of the security landscape (threats, risks, challenges and opportunities), the role of the Alliance, the strategy in coping with the security issues and on resources. It further entails a proper mix of forces (conventional and nuclear) that would ensure a credible capacity to implement a strategy to defend. Due consideration must be paid to the interdependence of the nuclear arsenal and other components of the overall strategic landscape. The balance between strategic defence and power projection, as well as the extent of mutual reinforcement with conventional weapons, are strategic considerations that must be analysed before a decision can be made. Additionally, in the nuclear field, a discussion about criteria that would ensure complimentary roles for nuclear forces and missile defence is vital before we start giving up the existing arrangements. Only after all of these tasks are completed can the Alliance decide what further cuts may be made to arsenals. Should common agreement be reached on the need to diminish even further the relevance of NATO's nuclear deterrence, alternatives must be identified for members that place a high emphasis on Allied nuclear extended deterrence. Third, throughout this process of Allied introspection differences in perceptions must be acknowledged and accepted. The strategic reality defines the assessment of the utility of a specific military doctrine and nuclear deterrent, and the differences must be taken into consideration.

The Alliance's Central and Eastern European members still place a high emphasis on defending against traditional threats (i.e., territorial integrity and host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign troops are viewed as survival characteristics of this defence). For them, hard security matters are still of relevance, nuclear deterrence and full nuclear consultations and operational inter-Allied cooperation are of greatest importance, and offensive capability is vital for perceived credibility. This does not mean that the CEE states are planning to launch a nuclear attack. It simply means that is part of their strategic culture to consider this type of assurance as

relevant in defining their security. We should not shy away from stating this publicly, as all nuclear powers do the same.

One example is the different perspectives on European Missile Defence. For the CEE states it has a distinct value as the first solid, physical connection between the region and the Alliance. BMD is in fact the most relevant transformation in NATO's posture from a Central and Eastern European members' perspective. This is the first explicit presence of NATO in the region. However, Western capitals do not share the same interest. For them, BMD is seen solely as a way to counteract potential missiles from the Middle East. Decision on BMD will have to address both perspectives. At the same time, different perceptions exist in other capitals regarding nuclear disarmament. Berlin activists have great influence amongst politicians, and thus the desire by some to eliminate all nuclear weapons, including vocal calls for the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.⁹ However, there are capitals where the public widely supports the security guarantees that come with these weapons.

To add to the already complex picture, there are other dividing lines aside from the strategic culture. Even within the same culture there are different views on nuclear disarmament. The controversy embodies an old dispute between two traditional schools of thought: that which places an emphasis on the political value of nuclear weapons and the other called the "war fighting" school of thought, which emphasises the credibility of the nuclear threat embedded in nuclear deterrence policy. Supporters of each school of thought can be found in each capital, depending on the ideological tendencies, and distinctions must be taken into consideration for the composition of solid Allied nuclear deterrence policy. To briefly sum it up, is important to note the difference in perceptions and to acknowledge the limits to common agreement on some topics.

Fourth, it has become apparent that the need for the CEE countries to take more ownership of the Allied process of consultation and decision-making through more active contributions to policy recommendation, based on their own cost-benefit analysis. The main objective is to ensure due consideration to their own security anxieties. NATO membership and the BMD programme have altered the strategic environment for the CEE states. The Alliance can offer instruments to advance the national interest, but it is a national responsibility to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and point out any red lines. Many of the new members have placed NATO extended deterrence, together with Article 5 security guarantees, at the centre of their defence policy. From this perspective it becomes their duty to make sure that Allied decisions reflect the appropriate defence posture for what they consider necessary for their own defence.

They must ensure that the Allies define clearly how far NATO will provide a reliable nuclear deterrent. Naturally, if the debate establishes a more limited outlook (e.g., eliminating tactical nuclear weapons), some countries might feel the need to identify necessary additional elements for a consolidated defence posture. The discussion might reveal that NATO can only offer a building block, whereas their national security needs might necessitate additional arrangements (e.g., bilateral or regional agreements or initiatives, further arms control regimes, new transparency measures, a consolidation of complementary dimensions of security). The discussion might also reveal that the implications for modifying the current arrangements is too costly in political terms because it may affect the unity of the Alliance.

Conclusion

I would reiterate the critical relevance of a common strategic culture as a foundation of a NATO "Grand Strategy". The strategic culture defines not only the perception of threats but also

⁹ Following the December 2008 launch of the Global Zero initiative, NATO's Strasbourg Declaration of February 2010 and the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway requested a debate in NATO about U.S. nuclear forces in Europe.

the vision of legitimate use of force. Hence, from this perspective, I submit that a lack of effort to merge distinct strategic cultures into a collective one at the Allied level is one of the rationales that have determined the notable strategic dissonance.

This is equally critical for any hope of deepening the integration process. Transformation this profound will take visionary leadership, consultation and interoperability. Limiting common action to simulation exercises and diplomatic drafting negotiations is not enough. This goal must be a commonly pursued endeavour.

As a Romanian, naturally my appeal is directed toward Central and Eastern European countries. While official representatives are constrained by national or Allied positions, I suggest that experts from civil society could have more freedom to explore out-of-the-box ways to progress.

A working group that would bring together experts from these countries is a needed mechanism for generating regional ownership. This would ensure that the internal cohesion of the Alliance would be consolidated. The needed motivation for clearing hurdles is easy to find simply by looking at overall threats such as WMD proliferation, the potential risk of nuclear terrorism related to criminal networks, the instable political situation in the Middle East, or the danger of a nuclear escalation of any potential conflict in the context of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, coupled with the Iranian nuclear programme.

Instead of listing the endless inventory of threats that NATO faces today, I will conclude by asserting that the transformation must come from within the Alliance of 28 members in order to deal with a transformed security landscape. The changes must be predictable, coherent and transparent, with foresight and due consideration to all potential implications.

Central Europeans and the Future of Extended Deterrence in Asia and the Middle East

Łukasz Kulesa

The Central European debate about NATO's defence and deterrence posture is focused mainly on the specifics of the regional security environment, most notably the context of Russian foreign and security policy and its military capabilities. Looking at the future of NATO policy, the countries in the region also think primarily about the credibility of the posture vis-à-vis possible Russian adventurism and intimidation. However, it is important to note that the internal discussions of the Alliance will not take place in a strategic vacuum. Similar questions about the present and future deterrence needs and the credibility of the United States are being formulated by America's allies in East Asia and by countries in the Middle East that are concerned about the developments in Syria and Iran. The NATO debate has been watched closely and analysed by other countries relying on U.S. security guarantees.¹

The decisions taken by the Alliance can affect debates on security policy in the countries of these two regions, and vice-versa. Already now, legitimate questions may be asked about the rationale for the forward-deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and nuclear-sharing arrangements in the absence of a clear nuclear threat, in comparison with the extended nuclear arrangements for East Asia, where U.S. allies face a WMD-armed North Korea. Similarly, if Iran emerges as a new nuclear weapons power in the Middle East, can the continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe be treated as an asset or a liability in designing deterrence policy against Iran? The United States, the main provider of extended deterrence globally, may find it increasingly difficult to reconcile the various perspectives under one coherent grand security strategy.

Links Between the Regional Debates on Extended Deterrence

For the countries of Central Europe, such a global perspective may seem to be of little, or even no concern. However, there are several links between their stance on extended deterrence and wider developments in East Asia and the Middle East.

The chances of increased tensions in the Middle East or East Asia requiring the involvement of the United States (and possibly also some of the most capable NATO allies) can heavily impact the likelihood of meeting Central European preferences for the Alliance's defence and deterrence policy. The U.S. strategic move towards Asia has already generated massive anxiety in Central Europe. It has been widely interpreted that the "pivot to Asia" would have negative consequences for U.S. force posture in Europe and the ability to reinforce European defences with U.S. assets during a crisis. For many Central Europeans, the decision to withdraw two of the U.S. Army's four Brigade Combat Teams from Europe translated into a perception of a decreased ability to commit heavy forces to a NATO Article 5 operation from the outset. Central Europeans have grudgingly accepted the new approach, which will involve increased rotational deployments of forces from the continental United States and a focus on joint training.² However, they are also following with anxiety U.S. announcements of plans to

¹ See: D. Yost, "NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture After the Chicago Summit: A Report on a Workshop in Rome, 25–27 June 2012", NATO Defense College, Rome, October 2012. According to one of the participants of the roundtable, Japan and South Korea watched the DDPR "like hawks".

² U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense", January 2012.

increase deployments to Asia (e.g., U.S. Marines in Australia and the broadening of the U.S. Navy presence in Asia–Pacific).

In the next 10 years, absent a major security crisis in the neighbouring regions, the United States would continue reducing its military footprint in Europe. Central European countries assess the credibility of deterrence through the traditional prism of the presence of significant U.S. assets on the continent (including the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons). However, for the United States, the reference points for judging the necessity to maintain nuclear and other capabilities in Europe might increasingly have more to do with developments in the Middle East and Asia than with the context of the Central Europe–Russia relationship. The discussions on NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) may be the last one conducted to a large extent independently from the assessment of U.S. deterrence obligations and requirements in other regions. A comparison of regional threats and deterrence requirements may lead the United States to downgrade NATO in the hierarchy of U.S. deterrence relationships. Instead of increasing efforts to address the “geopolitical insecurity” of Central Europeans,³ Washington may conclude that other regions require more urgent investments in deterrence credibility.

The importance of Central European allies to the United States—as compared to its Middle Eastern and Asian partners and allies—also is diminished by their limited contributions to U.S.-led military operations and their limited ability to provide for their own defence (including acquisitions and joint armament projects with the U.S.). In terms of global military expenditures, there is a huge gap between the positions of Japan (6th), Saudi Arabia (7th), South Korea (12th), Australia (14th) and the United Arab Emirates (16th), and the most capable Central European countries, Poland (21st) and Romania (54th).⁴

Developments in other regions can especially impact the future of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. In the latest round of the NATO deterrence debate that culminated with the adoption of the Strategic Concept in Lisbon in 2010 and the DDPR in Chicago in 2012, the role of the United States was crucial. The U.S. managed to translate the divergent views of the Allies into commonly agreed principles of NATO policy. If in the next decade the centre of gravity for United States security policy moves towards East Asia, or developments in the Middle East again cause U.S. military engagement in the region, Washington might be less willing to spend its political capital and devote resources to garner the support of the Allies for the retention of nuclear weapons in Europe. If the implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defence and the presence of conventional forces would be seen as both a practical and symbolic guarantee of U.S. engagement in Europe, the United States may be increasingly willing to introduce the so called Asian model of nuclear extended deterrence to the NATO context.⁵

Far less probable is the opposite development, that is, taking the status quo-oriented position of the Central Europeans as an argument for expanding the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in other regions. Their support for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe can strengthen the position of advocates of forward-deployments of these weapons in other regions. However, such proposals would most likely have little resonance with the United States.⁶

³ R. Graber, P. Kolaz, *Keeping New Allies: An Assessment of the U.S. Policy in Central Europe*, Center for European Policy Studies, Washington D.C., July 2010, p. 6.

⁴ Based on data from the SIPRI Military Expenditures Database.

⁵ For more about the models of extended deterrence, see: R. Tanter, “‘Just in Case’: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defence of Australia”, *Pacific Focus*, vol. XVI, no. 1, April 2011, pp. 114–117.

⁶ Some South Korean experts and policymakers call for the re-deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons. In 2010, Defence Minister Kim Tae Young seemed to back a review of the stationing issue in a parliamentary discussion. For a rebuttal, see: J. Lewis, “Should the U.S. Put Nuclear Weapons Back in Korea?”, *38north.org*, 27 December 2010, http://38north.org/2010/12/nukes_in_korea.

Extended Deterrence in East Asia

During the latest debate about the future of NATO policy, it was claimed that the East Asia model of extended deterrence may provide an attractive alternative to one based on the forward-deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons⁷ However, the viability of the Asian arrangement itself has been recently put to a test as a result of changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine and concerns in the region about China and, more directly, about the more bellicose North Korea. The basic characteristics of the Asian model differ considerably from the NATO arrangements:

- Unlike the NATO context, the U.S. security guarantees in Asia are not based on multilateral arrangements (the Washington Treaty), but from bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea (Republic of Korea) and Australia⁸;
- there is no equivalent of the Nuclear Planning Group that would enable routine consultations on nuclear planning, exercises and information-sharing between the United States and the allies involved;
- There are no arrangements similar to nuclear sharing, i.e., the option to use dual-capable delivery systems operated by an ally to deliver a U.S. nuclear weapon to a target in case of a conflict;
- Since the withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, there have been no U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons on the territories of America's East Asian allies. It is understood, however, that these weapons and their delivery systems can be re-introduced into the region in case of a crisis.

Historically, the United States' East Asian allies have not engaged in regular consultations about the role that nuclear weapons might play in specific scenarios involving U.S. security guarantees. After the withdrawal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the 1990s, it was understood by the allies in the region that certain capabilities and characteristics of U.S. nuclear doctrine had been introduced or were being maintained for use in any regional nuclear contingencies. These included the retention of B-61 nuclear bombs to be used by dual-capable fighters, maintaining a stock of nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles that could be launched from attack submarines (TLAM-N), and also the ability to forward-deploy nuclear-armed bombers to the region, especially to Guam. However, the countries in the region have neither engaged with the U.S. in exercises involving scenarios using nuclear weapons nor taken part in nuclear planning.⁹

A major change occurred during preparations of the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, when the U.S. held extensive consultations with the political and military establishments of its East Asian allies.¹⁰ It needed to take into account the views of its allies on the complicated security environment in the region, and specifically to secure the support of Japan and South Korea for significant changes that were to be introduced into the document. These changes included the re-formulation of negative security guarantees (which limit the scope of nuclear retaliation against North Korea in case of a non-nuclear attack) and the decision to retire sea-launched nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The latter issue generated controversy in Japan, where some experts had viewed this particular capability as an element of deterrence posture best suited for Japan's defence (because of its long-standing prohibition of nuclear weapons on its soil). The decision on the TLAM-N withdrawal from the U.S. arsenal was justified in the 2010 NPR report on the grounds that "the deterrence and assurance roles of TLAMN can be

⁷ K.H. Kamp, "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Nuclear Sharing instead of Nuclear Stationing", NATO Defence College, *Research Paper*, No. 68, May 2011.

⁸ Taiwan is also covered by U.S. security guarantees.

⁹ K. Jimbo, "Japanese Perceptions of Obama's Nuclear 'twin Commitments'", *The Japan Times*, 4 March 2009, www.japantimes.co.jp.

¹⁰ See: M. Tsuruoka, "Why the NATO Nuclear Debate Is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa", *GMF Policy Brief*, 8 October 2010.

adequately substituted” by other elements of the U.S. nuclear posture, such as the forward-deployment of air-delivered nuclear weapons during a crisis or the land- and sea-based elements of the nuclear triad.¹¹

After the publication of the Nuclear Posture Review Report, both Japan and South Korea lobbied the United States to continue the enhanced consultations on extended deterrence. Some experts even called for using NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group as a model for the dialogue.¹² While the proposal should be seen rather as hyperbole about their willingness to engage in such things as nuclear sharing, the East Asian allies are interested in using bilateral strategic dialogue formats with the United States (including the extended deterrence dialogue established in the framework of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee or the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee used in the U.S.–Republic of Korea dialogue) to address such issues as the requirements for extended deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, nuclear planning and the coordination of joint operations.

Despite the differences, it is worth noting that some of the concerns of America’s East Asian allies have been strikingly similar to the ones expressed by Central Europeans within the NATO framework. First, the crucial issue for both groups is the credibility of the U.S. security commitment. As a result, nuclear capabilities are not seen as a separate issue but rather as part of a larger mechanism that provides visible assurances to U.S. allies. Other important elements include the deployment of conventional forces, the degree of cooperation among militaries (planning, training), and joint strategic projects, such as the development of a missile-defence system. The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan has been highlighted as enhancing deterrence because of both their combat potential and their function as “tripwires” for U.S. engagement in case of a direct attack.

Second, similar to Central Europeans’ anxieties about the U.S.–Russian relationship and the perspective of sacrificing the interest of the region for the sake of the advances of the two superpowers’ strategic dialogue, the East Asian allies have expressed their unease with the U.S.–China dialogue. They were interested primarily in the U.S. sharing information about the details of the discussions, including any exchanges about nuclear doctrines and capabilities. In the long run, the Asian allies can be concerned about the possibility of Washington modifying its extended deterrence posture in order to strengthen the strategic relationship with China or avoid friction within the relationship.

Finally, the issue of self-reliance and the limits of extended deterrence have become a prominent feature in the strategic debate in both regions. In Central Europe, it was triggered by the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the anxiety over the reliability of security guarantees offered to the most exposed allies in case of a sudden deterioration of relations with Russia or scenarios of intimidation, provocations or limited incursions on their territories. It was argued that reliance on NATO-level deterrence should be supplemented by credible national-level defence capabilities. Similarly, in the context of the North Korean armed provocations against the South in 2010 (the sinking of the corvette *Cheonan* and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island), the issue of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence was raised in the strategic debate in the Republic of Korea.¹³ Since it is clear that some of the DPRK’s actions might not trigger a U.S. response (either due to their limited scale or because of U.S. concerns about the involvement of China in a crisis), the further development of deterrence capabilities at the national level was envisaged. The recent agreement with the United States to expand the range of South Korea’s indigenously produced ballistic missiles from 300 to 800 kilometres and the payload of its unmanned aerial

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report”, Washington D.C., April 2010, p. 28.

¹² Cited in: C. Seongwhun, “Changing Dynamics of U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula”, *Pacific Focus*, vol. XVI, no. 1, April 2011, p. 60.

¹³ S. Snyder, “Finding a Balance between Assurances and Abolition”, *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 18, no. 1, March 2011, p. 148.

vehicles can be seen as the most striking example of the increased emphasis on self-reliance.¹⁴ Interestingly, this development almost coincided with the announcement of the decision by Polish authorities to procure their own air defence system with missile defence capabilities, a move also influenced by the need to augment national defence.

In all three aspects, the U.S.'s East Asian allies and Central European NATO members may benefit from increased contacts and consultations. Exchanging information about deterrence requirements in their respective regions and lessons-learnt in the security relationship with the United States could be mutually beneficial. The opportunity for including non-strategic nuclear weapons in wider arms-control negotiations between those states that hold them can also become an important issue for consultations. From the East Asian perspective, the non-strategic arsenals of both Russia and China must be taken into account. It should be noted that the proposals by the Central European states for Russia to relocate its non-strategic nuclear weapons away from NATO's borders has not been positively received in Japan.¹⁵ This is because, first, Tokyo would face the possibility of having additional Russian nuclear weapons stored at sites in the Asian part of the country, which could in turn provoke a Chinese reaction and would have a direct impact on the security environment in the region. Second, Japan's experience with arms-control negotiations in the 1980s included witnessing proposals to limit the geographical scope of the U.S.–Soviet Union Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (banning land-based cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km) to the European part of the Soviet Union. Such a solution would have most probably resulted in the massive deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles closer to Japan. Although both superpowers eventually agreed to the global option of the total elimination of their intermediate-range delivery systems, Japan remains wary of the possibility of a repetition of this episode with regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Extended Deterrence in the Middle East

Recent security developments in the Middle East seem to confirm the basic argument of the Central Europeans about the continued relevance of a credible NATO defence and deterrence policy vis-à-vis state-originating threats.

The biggest, most immediate challenge for NATO seems to be the situation in Syria, especially the likelihood of the transformation of the civil war there into an inter-state conflict involving Turkey and possibly other NATO members. As the tensions between Syria and Turkey grew throughout 2012, the latter has been frequently referring to its membership in NATO and Article 5 guarantees as a means of preventing Syria from initiating trans-border incidents or an all-out attack on Turkey.

With the situation in Syria developing rapidly, a scenario in which the regime would resort to the use of force against Turkey or other NATO members it accuses of providing assistance to Syrian rebel forces cannot be ruled out. Warnings about the possibility to use "unconventional weapons" (understood as chemical weapons) in the event of "external aggression" add to the gravity of the situation.¹⁶ The possibility of the deployment of NATO missile defence assets was brought up as a deterrence measure to mitigate the Syrian regime's behaviour.¹⁷ For Central European NATO allies, the Syrian case can be seen as a litmus test of

¹⁴ Ch. Sang-Hun, "U.S. Agrees to Let South Korea Extend Range of Ballistic Missiles", *The New York Times*, 7 October 2012, www.nytimes.com.

¹⁵ M. Tsuruoka, "Relocating Tactical Nuclear Weapons? A View from Japan", 30 May 2011, www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2011/tactical-nuclear-weapons/?searchterm=tsuruoka.

¹⁶ N. MacFarquhar, E. Schmitt, "Syria Threatens Chemical Attack on Foreign Force", *The New York Times*, 23 July 2012.

¹⁷ "Turkey Says NATO Patriot Missiles Could Counter Syria's Chemical Weapons", *Today's Zaman*, 13 November 2012, www.todayszaman.com.

the ability of NATO and the United States to bolster the defences of a member confronted with intimidating behaviour by its neighbour.

While the Syrian civil war may spill over to NATO-protected territory, the developments surrounding the Iranian nuclear crisis can also directly affect the Alliance's defence and deterrence policy. The perspective of an Israeli or U.S.-led attack against Iranian nuclear installations has prompted some Iranian officials to threaten to retaliate against missile defence radar installations in Turkey as well as other targets, a move that would require a NATO response.¹⁸ There is the possibility of Iran waging a terrorist campaign against targets in NATO countries, directly or through the use of proxies. NATO would also need to contemplate its overall course of action in the event of the failure of prevention policy and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. Discussions about the contours of a deterrence strategy vis-à-vis a nuclear-armed Iran are, however, highly speculative, and the United States and other NATO allies remain concentrated on preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.¹⁹

From the Central European point of view, all of these developments strengthen the case for the continued need for the retention by the United States of adequate extended deterrence capabilities in Europe. The same capabilities are seen also by Central Europeans as relevant to their own security. This includes foremost the deployment of missile defence system elements in Southern and Central Europe, in line with the Phased Adaptive Approach and the decisions taken by NATO in Chicago. As stated in the DDPR, a missile defence system "is being established in the light of threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area", while taking into account the commonly agreed threat assessment.²⁰ Therefore, the developments in the Middle East *de facto* provide the main justification for the build-up of the system in its current configuration. The countries of Central Europe view the deployment of missile defence components in Romania and Poland mainly through the prism of securing a U.S. presence in the region and fostering closer ties with the United States as a means to check any possible aggressive Russian policy. However, they will also need to take into account in the future the fact that any major change in the Middle Eastern security environment, especially resulting in the discontinuation or credible limitation of the Iranian ballistic missile development programme, will have a direct effect on the deployment of the missile defence system in Europe. Taken the position of Russia, the United States would probably use such a change in the threat assessment to delay or modify the implementation of its plans, especially regarding the activation of an SM-3 base in Poland.

Second, the stationing of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe may be seen as part of a policy to reassure southern NATO Allies and possibly also partners in the Middle East. In this context, the prospects of a nuclear Iran may provide a "second breath" to proponents of continued forward-deployment of these weapons. Establishing a credible deterrence regime against Iran would require a nuclear component, as NATO allies and partners could be subjects of threats or coercion based on the use of nuclear weapons. Providing nuclear-backed reassurances may also be essential in halting any attempts by regional powers (Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Egypt) to follow the Iranian path towards a nuclear programme with a military dimension.

As the deployment of nuclear weapons in new locations in the region would be difficult for political, legal and strategic reasons, possible U.S. nuclear assurances could be linked (perhaps implicitly) to the presence of non-strategic nuclear weapons already deployed in Europe. Their implementation may involve discrete consultations with partners on threat

¹⁸ J. Kucera, "Turkey Dismisses Iranian Threat Against NATO Missile Shield", 13 December 2011, www.eurasianet.org/node/64686.

¹⁹ B. Tertrais, "Security Guarantees and Extended Deterrence in the Gulf Region: A European Perspective", *Strategic Insight*, vol. VIII, issue 5, December 2009, Center for Contemporary Conflicts, Monterey, California.

²⁰ "Deterrence and Defence Posture Review", NATO Press Release (2012) 063, issued on 20 May 2012, www.nato.int.

perceptions and deterrence scenarios. From the point of view of Central Europeans, the positive consequences of retaining non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe may come, however, at the price of substantial changes in the implementation of the Alliance's nuclear policy. They may involve the relocation of U.S. nuclear weapons from the northern to the southern part of Europe (Turkey and Italy) and the adaptation of nuclear planning and exercises to the new Iranian contingencies.²¹

Concentration on the southern flank of the Alliance also may diminish the chances of implementing the conventional reassurance measures called for by Central Europeans. Apart from the diversion of NATO's resources to the south, Russia may emerge as a valuable partner in establishing a containment regime against Iran, including through the use of sanctions via UN Security Council resolutions. In this scenario, the U.S. may wish to limit areas of friction with Moscow or induce it towards more cooperation by, for example, indicating a willingness to reduce or withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe if the Russians reciprocate with substantial assistance in containing the Iranian nuclear and ballistic threats.

Conclusions

Despite the differences in the security environment, the threat perceptions and the profile of the U.S. engagement in each region, Washington's allies and partners in Central Europe, East Asia and the Middle East share similar anxieties about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees and the availability of capabilities needed for effective deterrence. In the next 10 years, the United States, faced with cuts in its defence budget and wary of overstretching its forces, may be inclined to make changes to its extended deterrence posture in these regions.

The changes can affect first and foremost the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is possible, although unlikely, that these changes could result in increased reliance on nuclear weapons (including forward-deployed warheads).²² It is more probable that limited conventional force deployments and territorial missile defence cooperation (combined with strategic nuclear forces) may become more preferable to Washington as elements of U.S. commitments to the defence of the Allies. In this sense, East Asia specifically may become a laboratory for practicing extended nuclear deterrence in the 21st century in the absence of forward-deployed weapons. Much will depend on the security developments outside of the Euro-Atlantic environment, especially in East Asia. If the Asian model of extended deterrence is maintained despite the pressures caused by North Korean adventurism, the arguments in favour of the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe will lose some of their appeal to the United States. Similarly, a resolution of the Syrian crisis and prevention of the nuclearisation of Iran will remove the need to extend nuclear deterrence guarantees to the countries of the region.

The countries of Central Europe should pay increased attention to the way in which the U.S. will manage its security relationships in East Asia and the Middle East. Establishing a security dialogue with the countries in both regions, focused on extended deterrence, may be beneficial for designing a policy to influence or deal with the possible changes of U.S. policy. The change in the NATO nuclear posture may come not as a result of achieving Russian reciprocity on reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons or more benign NATO–Russia relations, but as a consequence of the U.S. applying lessons learnt from extended deterrence relationships in other parts of the world.

²¹ J.L. Samaan, "The Day After Iran Goes Nuclear: Implications for NATO", NATO Defence College, *Research Paper*, no. 71, January 2012, p. 8.

²² Suggested for NATO, e.g., by A. Krepinevich, "Strategy in a Time of Austerity", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 6, November/December 2012, p. 68.

Isabelle Williams and Steve Andreasen

A U.S. Perspective on Addressing Central European Assurance Needs

The United States has a unique relationship with Central Europe. Given the long-standing historical, cultural, political, economic and security ties, it is extremely difficult to conceive of a scenario in which the United States would not take seriously the concerns of the region. Nevertheless, the United States is facing an increasingly complex international security environment and a range of security threats, juxtaposed with an historic global and domestic financial crisis. This will mean that policy and decision-makers will be constantly re-evaluating how to best ensure the security of the United States and its allies—including in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

The U.S. Perspective on the Evolving Security Environment and Emerging Threats

The U.S. is in a transitional period with the withdrawal of troops from Iraq now complete, the shifting by the end of 2014 of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, and the recognition that the U.S. must take significant steps to reduce federal spending and develop long-term economic strength. U.S. political and military leaders are therefore in the process of re-examining the security and defence priorities and re-evaluating the scope and focus of the nation's military. These priorities and policies are driven by an assessment of U.S. national security interests and current and future threats to those interests.

The DOD report "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense", released in early 2012, gives a good indication of where the United States perceives its strategic priorities in the next decade. The report states that the U.S. is "at a strategic turning point after a decade of war" and will be reshaping its Joint Force to emphasise the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and support for political and economic reform across the Middle East and North Africa.¹

The report states that while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, "we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia Pacific region." This rebalancing reflects continuing, if not growing concern over the role China will play in what is already a complex security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. The DOD report states that most European countries are now "producers of security rather than consumers of it", and this has created a "strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities." Europe, however, continues to be viewed as America's "principal partner in seeking global and economic security" and the U.S. will of necessity continue its support for a stable, secure and prosperous Europe, including sustaining, if not strengthening NATO.

There has also been a renewed focus on the Middle East, given the political changes that remain ongoing and uncertain. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the region and beyond will continue to be of serious concern, especially the potential for a nuclear-armed Iran, terrorists acquiring such weapons, and North Korea's nuclear weapons programme.

These security priorities will increasingly be discussed in the context of budgetary considerations. Current law mandating an additional \$1.2 trillion in U.S. budget cuts over the next decade—roughly half from defence—will go into effect in January 2013 absent an agreement between the president and Congress to change the law. Avoiding this "fiscal

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense", January 2012.

cliff” could consume Washington for months, and ensuring that defence strategy and budget priorities are in sync will receive heightened attention. No matter how these budget issues are resolved, there likely will be additional cuts in defence spending, including spending associated with maintaining and modernising U.S. nuclear forces.

The U.S. rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region has led to a renewed discussion about the role of Europe in U.S. security. This has included growing American frustration, increasingly expressed publicly, that Europeans have not spent more on their own defence. In June 2011, then-U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates gave a speech in Brussels in which he told NATO members, “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence.”²

The recent reductions in European defence spending also risk making Europeans even more dependent on the United States for their participation in NATO security missions. The operations in Libya demonstrated that without U.S. support the European countries would have serious shortfalls in their defence sectors, including in surveillance capability, air-to-air refuelling, smart munitions, strategic and tactical transport, and medical support.³

One issue that will likely continue to be debated within the U.S. over the next decade is the appropriate size of the American forces stationed in Europe. There are about 80,000 U.S. troops in Europe today. Even with the two Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) scheduled to return to the U.S. by 2015, that would still leave about 69,000 troops in Europe.⁴ One U.S.-based BCT has also been assigned to the NATO Response Force and will return to Europe every year for training. The remaining forces will also be complemented by missile defences on land and Aegis-equipped ships at sea, forward-stationed special operations aircraft, and a small aviation detachment in Poland.

There may not be durable political consensus within the U.S. on this issue, in particular if the U.S. is perceived as shouldering an unfair portion of the burden of European security. The impending budget cuts will make it more difficult to justify the need to keep forces permanently stationed in Europe at the current levels if Europe no longer faces the threat of a large-scale conventional war on the continent. However, many recognise the importance for NATO—including its Central European members—of continued U.S. military presence, noting that Europe will remain an essential platform for out-of-area missions and that the cost to maintain significant numbers of troops is a necessary investment for a secure Europe, which benefits the U.S.

U.S.–Russia Relations

Despite U.S. interest and policy preferences in improving U.S.–Russian bilateral relations, the uncertainty about the political and security direction of Russia in the next 10 years is a major variable that could yet impact U.S. security priorities. Today, within the U.S. there are different views regarding Russia’s intentions and the desired relationship between the country and the U.S. and NATO. For some, cooperation with Russia is viewed as essential if there is to be success in dealing with many of the U.S.’s key security concerns, including nuclear proliferation and counter-terrorism, and it is likely the U.S. will continue to try to forge a working partnership with Russia on core security issues.

² R. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO),” speech given at the Security and Defence Agenda in Brussels, 10 June 2011.

³ European Union Committee, “European Defence Capabilities: Lessons from the Past, Signposts for the Future”, UK House of Lords, 24 April 2012.

⁴ K. Parrish, “Panetta Outlines U.S. Troop Changes in Europe,” American Forces Press Service, 16 February 2012. www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67232.

However, this view has become increasingly challenging as Russia continues to tout the West—and in particular, NATO—as a security threat. Moreover, difficulties in the bilateral relationship, including over Libya, Syria, missile defence and the stalemate in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty, continue to plague U.S.–Russian relations and fuel critics in both Washington and Moscow.

The U.S. must also manage an uneasy NATO–Russia relationship. NATO members have addressed the challenges of the still uncertain relationship with Russia by reassuring Central European allies while reaching out to Russia in general terms through cooperative activities. However, measures to reassure Allies, in particular attempts with a security dimension, have often been interpreted by Russia as antagonistic and have triggered rhetorical responses and military posturing. Similarly, measures to reassure Russia have been interpreted by certain Allies as a weakening resolve on the part of the Alliance to use its capabilities, and ultimately weakening NATO's Article 5 commitment. Successfully balancing the Allies' assurance needs while building a more constructive NATO–Russia partnership will be essential for progress on key U.S. and NATO priorities.

Prospects for Change in the Next Decade

History continuously teaches us that the security environment is not static. In August 2001, few analysts suggested that the United States and NATO would have ground troops fighting in Afghanistan for more than a decade. One wonders what the equivalent observation will be 10 years from today. Just on the military side of the ledger, will there be a new and perhaps sustained conflict in the Middle East over Iran's nuclear programme? Will there be an increasing number of nuclear states in this volatile region, and an increasing need for a more robust U.S. military presence? Will the relative peace that has been sustained on the Korean Peninsula for 60 years break down? Will territorial disputes in Asia–Pacific lead to a military conflict? Will a future cyberwar lead to a shooting war?

While it may be difficult to predict which of these possible threats and challenges are most likely over the next decade, many of these challenges would at a minimum tilt U.S. attention and resources even further away from Central Europe and NATO. That said, NATO would not be irrelevant to managing these future threats and challenges.

The Credibility of U.S. Assurance

A number of U.S. allies around the world view U.S. extended deterrence as an important aspect of their security. U.S. assurances that it will deter attacks and protect allies in the event of an attack consists of multilayered defences, including nuclear and conventional forces, diplomacy and economic support.⁵

Within the U.S., a commitment to extended deterrence and make assurances to its European allies has remained remarkably constant over the past several decades. Europe and the U.S. share strong economic, cultural, political and military bonds, and have maintained a close relationship, a working partnership and a security alliance that is unique in history. The security concerns of NATO Allies and extended deterrence are taken seriously by U.S. politicians and decision-makers, and it is widely recognised that the wellbeing of U.S. Allies—both economically and in terms of security—is directly in the national interest of the United States.

The U.S. has also developed a unique relationship with the Central European states, which look to the U.S. to represent their interests against the larger European NATO Allies and for protection against Russian intimidation. Poland is seen within the U.S. as a leader of this

⁵ W.J. Perry and B. Scowcroft (Co-Chairs), "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy", *Independent Task Force Report*, no. 62., Council on Foreign Relations, 2009.

sub-region, and it has frequently worked to find pragmatic ways to balance its own security concerns with those of the U.S. and other NATO states.⁶

The geographical expansion of NATO in the 1990s fundamentally changed the internal debate on assurance within NATO. Today, the main focus of security concern for many NATO members is no longer Russia or the threat of direct attack, conventional or otherwise, against NATO territory. Rather, the concerns are related to the threats posed by instability and conflict beyond NATO's borders, cyberattacks, energy security, environmental and resource constraints, and the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

However, during the discussions leading up to the 2010 Strategic Concept and 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), countries in Central and Eastern Europe voiced concerns about the commitment of the U.S. to reassure its European allies—especially given the new strategic focus on Asia-Pacific and the Middle East and the prospect of U.S. defence cuts. These states generally support NATO placing more emphasis on its traditional role as the guarantor of the borders and territory of its European members. Their concerns played an important role in shaping the final language of both the Lisbon and Chicago summit documents, which reaffirmed Article 5 collective defence as NATO's core mission and identified reassurance measures as priorities for NATO.⁷

The DDPR, tasked to NATO members in Lisbon in 2010, was an important opportunity for them to define an agreed set of defence priorities that address the existing security context and a strategy for achieving these objectives. As these discussions continued, the process begun at Lisbon of broadening deterrence beyond nuclear weapons to missile defence, cybersecurity, and energy security, have for the most part yet to be matched with resources and capabilities, and on the key issue of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO security policy, the Allies have made little progress in defining a clear strategy for changing the status quo.

Nuclear Weapons

Since the end of the Cold War, the role of nuclear weapons in NATO security policy has steadily been reduced, both operationally and politically. Thousands of nuclear weapons have already been withdrawn from Europe by Washington. Through a series of unilateral-reciprocal measures, the United States and Russia retired or destroyed thousands of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) along with warheads and launchers designed for European missions.

The 2010 Strategic Concept and the DDPR both state that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance; and that the alliance is resolved to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. Tension persists within the Alliance—and within the U.S.—as to whether these two points are mutually exclusive or mutually reinforcing, in particular whether NATO can remain a nuclear alliance without U.S. TNW deployed in Europe. Deliberation on the Strategic Concept and the DDPR led certain members, especially Central and Eastern European states, to place a renewed emphasis on the role of the remaining U.S. TNW in European security. However, for many other members, the nuclear deterrence mission—including assurance—can be accomplished without the presence of U.S. TNW on European soil.

That said, all NATO members support an agreement with Russia that would provide for greater transparency, confidence-building measures and further reductions in TNW in the context of reciprocal reductions with Russia.

⁶ C. Kelleher, "Interlinked: Assurance, Russia, and Further Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons", in: S. Andreasen, I. Williams (eds.), *Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action*, NTI, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 123.

⁷ J. Shea, "Keeping NATO Relevant", *Policy Outlook*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2012.

Missile Defence

Reflecting a new consensus for an increasing role for missile defence in NATO deterrence and assurance policies, NATO members agreed in Lisbon to embrace the Obama administration's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defence. EPAA relies on sea-based Aegis missile deployments and upgraded land-based Standard Missiles, to be deployed in sequence over the next decade. The U.S. will finance the Aegis and SM3 interceptors while other nations are expected to finance their own interceptors. NATO will fund the common command-and-control system. Budget pressures on both sides of the Atlantic may yet play a role in the development of the EPAA along with the continuous assessment of the evolving missile threat.

The United States, NATO and Russia reached agreement at Lisbon in the NATO–Russia Council to pursue missile defence cooperation. This agreement reflects the key role that missile defence can play, both as a measure of assurance within NATO and in cooperation with Russia. Whether a durable agreement that advances both of these goals can be reached with Russia after the U.S. election is far from certain; however, such an agreement could be a game changer in Euro-Atlantic security.

Conventional Forces

NATO states have committed to deploy more flexible, mobile and versatile conventional force capabilities, which are generally regarded as more suitable to the new security environment and a more effective deterrent to aggression. At the Riga summit in 2006, alliance leaders committed to developing national land forces that were at least 40% deployable and 8% deployable on a sustainable basis (targets that were later raised to 50% and 10%).⁸

Those targets remain operative, though the European financial crisis remains a significant drag on their implementation. In Lisbon in 2010, the Allies pledged to “sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced” and to “maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO's usability targets.”⁹ Just one year later, however, in commenting on the NATO operation in Libya, Secretary Gates bluntly stated, “while every Alliance member voted for [the] Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those Allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't.”¹⁰

Achieving a more deployable and sustainable NATO force will require a sustained commitment of resources as well as defence reforms in many NATO member states—by no means certain. The U.S. contribution to overall NATO defence spending has risen from about half the total budget to nearly three quarters. Today, only five of the 26 European NATO member states contribute at least 2% of their GDP to defence and only about a dozen have met goals for making military forces deployable and sustainable, resulting in a significant gap between U.S. capabilities and the rest of NATO.¹¹

⁸ “Comprehensive Political Guidance Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government”, Riga, 29 November 2006, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁹ “Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on 20 November 2010”, *NATO Press Release PR/CP (2010)0155*.

¹⁰ R. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO)”, speech given at the Security and Defence Agenda in Brussels, 10 June 2011.

¹¹ J. Shea, “Keeping NATO Relevant”, *Policy Outlook*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2012.

Cyberattacks

The issue of cybersecurity—the protection of government, military and civilian networks—continues to grow in importance in terms of both the risks and consequences of a cyberattack. Digital infrastructure has already suffered intrusions that have allowed criminals to steal hundreds of millions of dollars and nation-states and other entities to steal intellectual property and sensitive military information. There is a growing concern that cyberattacks will transition from disruptive to destructive attacks. There is also a non-zero risk that such an intrusion could trigger a security crisis—for example, by triggering a false warning of a missile attack or an intrusion into national command-and-control systems—that could lead to a conflict.

The recent Strategic Concept has sought to broaden NATO's mandate to "prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyberattacks."¹² In Chicago, NATO members reaffirmed the cyberdefence commitments made at the Lisbon Summit and noted the subsequent adoption of the Cyber Defence Policy and Action Plan, which is now being implemented.¹³ Developing a reliable mechanism within NATO for the early exchange of information relating to cyberthreats—in particular, those with a military-security dimension—as well as implementing shared approaches to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyberattacks would strengthen assurance.

Expectations from the CEE vs. U.S. Policy Priorities and Capabilities

As the United States looks toward the security challenges and priorities of the coming decade, American policy-makers and decision-makers will be weighing the security needs of its allies—including those in Europe, the Middle East and Asia—with the country's own unique global interests. U.S. nuclear policies will also need to consider the policies of other nuclear weapons states, in particular Russia and China, as well as the U.S.'s allies.

Since the formation of NATO, the expectations and concerns of the European allies have largely aligned with U.S. security priorities. However, there would appear to be more scope for divergence looking ahead to the next decade. This will depend in large part on the relationship between the U.S. with Europe and Russia: if relations continue to deteriorate, this will act to further fuel Central European concerns, and would therefore impact expectations placed on the U.S. It also depends on which issues the U.S. prioritises over the coming years.

There are serious uncertainties in U.S.–Russian relations at this time and serious concerns in parts of Europe and the U.S. regarding Russian intentions. However, adopting NATO policies that are perceived as responding to a "resurgent Russia" could undermine the policy of "resetting" U.S.–Russian relations and may inflame Euro-Atlantic Security. From the U.S. perspective, this could result in shifting attention and resources away from growing strategic priorities in other parts of the world.

The U.S. and NATO members are now therefore grappling with how best to provide assurance to allies without contributing to a new Cold War mindset in both NATO and Russia. This will entail demonstrating an awareness of Russian security perspectives and increased efforts to enhance cooperative security, transparency and accountability among all the states. A key challenge is whether NATO, the U.S. and Russia can develop a new process to discuss key security issues and the requirements of assurance within NATO and in existing NATO–Russia or U.S.–Russia bilateral discussions.

¹² "Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on 20 November 2010", *NATO Press Release PR/CP (2010)0155*.

¹³ "Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012", *NATO Press Release (2012) 062*.

The Way Forward: Sustainability of the Current NATO Deterrence Posture in the Next Decade

Despite NATO's failure so far to develop a clear strategy on TNW, both the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 DDPR endorse further reductions. Moreover, there is an increasing recognition that the status quo within NATO is not sustainable. The financial and political pressures over the next 10 years on both sides of the Atlantic are simply too great.

Financially, it is hard to imagine a scenario whereby the looming "sequestration" process in Washington does not lead to cuts in defence spending over the next 10 years that would impact U.S. nuclear programs, including those related to TNW. This past June, Sen. Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told reporters that the Pentagon should head off the defence cuts that will go into effect next year by pre-emptively agreeing to cut \$10 billion a year for the next decade—\$100 billion—and he suggested that some cuts could come from the costs of maintaining and modernising the nuclear stockpile.¹⁴

The cost of the extension programme of the B-61 (the tactical nuclear bomb deployed by the U.S. in Europe) has risen substantially over the past year, and is now estimated to total \$10 billion.¹⁵ It could well cost more. Already, the programme has been pushed back by two years from 2017 to 2019—and it is certainly a candidate for further changes. A nuclear capable Joint Strike Fighter has also been pushed back, from 2017 to 2020. Of course, financial and political considerations in the European NATO member states also point to changes in the current posture, in particular with respect to Dual Capable Aircraft.

A change in the nuclear status quo also makes strategic sense: NATO's serious conventional capability gaps and resource constraints for likely contingencies strongly suggest that over the long-term NATO should not sustain a program that spends scarce defence resources on TNW capabilities that are no longer militarily useful. To continue doing so is not smart, and it is not defence.

The history of missile defence since the Reagan era also suggests changes in posture over the 10 years course of what could be three presidential terms. Every administration from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama has conducted a comprehensive review of missile defence, and each review has led to changes in the programme. Moreover, defence cuts could also impact missile defence. Finally, the very title, "European Phased Adaptive Approach", suggests a system in which component parts and timelines will be periodically re-assessed and adapted to evolving threats.

Finally, U.S. conventional forces including those committed to NATO will be vulnerable to the same strong budget currents as nuclear forces and missile defence, as well as changes in global security currents. As discussed earlier, barring a major deterioration in Euro-Atlantic security, both the U.S. budget and global threat forecasts suggest changes to current and planned U.S. conventional force capabilities in Europe over the next decade.

Deterring threats will always be a core component of NATO; however, recent discussions have increasingly addressed the question of what is the appropriate mix of tools for this task and in particular whether the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence can be reduced. Reading the Strategic Concept and DDPR as policy prescriptions, NATO appears to be pointed in the direction of identifying a safer, more stable form of deterrence that would out of necessity require an increased role for cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic region and improved relations with Russia. Unfortunately, there is as yet little in the way of a strategy and very little urgency or energy to fill this prescription. Yet, the debate is unavoidable as NATO members,

¹⁴ W. Pincus, "Sen. Levin: Defense Dept. Could Cut Budget Now to Avoid Severe Reductions Next Year", *The Washington Post*, 12 June, 2012.

¹⁵ D. Priest, "The B61 Bomb: A Case Study in Costs and Needs", *The Washington Post*, 17 September, 2012.

including the United States, grapple with decreasing budgets and an increasingly complex set of threats and security priorities.

Taken into account the outcome of the 2012 presidential election in the United States, nonproliferation and arms control will remain on the agenda for the U.S. and NATO. The DDPR and Strategic Concept both committed the Alliance to further reductions in TNW, albeit in the context of reciprocal measures with Russia (no details have been provided about what would constitute “reciprocal measures”). This echoes statements that have been made in the past few years by the U.S.¹⁶ and several of its European allies—including Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store¹⁷—to reduce and eventually eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in the Euro-Atlantic region.

During the 2010 Strategic Concept and the DDPR debate, the question of NATO’s role in arms control and disarmament was seriously discussed. Although the scope for a more proactive role will remain limited by the fact that NATO itself is not a party to arms control agreements,¹⁸ several NATO members have urged that the Alliance play a more active role in arms control and disarmament, noting in particular the increased interest in curbing proliferation through reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

Following the Lisbon 2010 NATO Summit, a new Committee on WMD Control and Disarmament (WCDC) was created to act as an institutional centre for NATO members to exchange views on disarmament issues and to function as the forum for the United States to consult with the Allies on the prospect of negotiations on TNW. However, during discussions on the DDPR it was decided that this Committee was to be replaced with another body—the scope of which is not yet known. The end of the WCDC and the uncertainties regarding its successor in part reflects opposition from a few countries, including France, to NATO assuming a greater role in disarmament and arms control, a discussion which is likely to continue within NATO.¹⁹

In order to make progress on further reductions it will be essential that NATO–Russian relations improve. The near term priority for NATO—led by the United States—will likely be non-treaty based efforts aimed at building confidence and exploring options to enhance the transparency of TNW in Europe. It will be important that NATO members measure Russian reciprocity broadly, “[t]aking into account the full range of political and security issues This approach will allow the United States and NATO to take meaningful steps in nuclear risk reduction, mindful of the interrelationships with Russia but not rigidly linked.”²⁰

Conclusion

Fifty years ago, President John F. Kennedy said, “If there is any current trend toward meeting present problems with old clichés, this is the moment to stop it.”²¹ NATO is not an old

¹⁶ The U.S. Senate resolution to ratify the New START Treaty includes language that supports securing and reducing tactical nuclear weapons.

¹⁷ R. Sikorski and J. G. Store, “NATO, Russia, and Tactical Nuclear Arms”, *The New York Times*, 14 May 2012.

¹⁸ In negotiations where NATO’s interests are directly involved, the role of NATO has been to provide the framework within which to coordinate an alliance position.

¹⁹ S. Lunn, “NATO Nuclear Policy: Reflections on Lisbon and Looking Ahead to the DDPR”, in S. Andreasen, I. Williams (eds.), *Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action*, NTI, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 34.

²⁰ S. Nunn, “The Race between Cooperation and Catastrophe”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2011, www.nti.org.

²¹ J.F. Kennedy, “Yale University Commencement Address,” 11 June 1962, available at: www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/Kennedy-Library-Miscellaneous-Information/Yale-University-Commencement-Address.aspx.

cliché—it remains an essential foundation for European security. But for it to remain so, it will need to continuously re-examine its strategy for ensuring security so that it can adjust to rapidly evolving threats, changes in available resources and opportunities to advance core security objectives, such as nonproliferation. All of this argues for anticipating further change to NATO's defence and deterrence posture over the coming decade.

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